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THREE DISCOUNT WINDOWS
Kathryn Judge†
It is widely assumed that the Federal Reserve is the lender of last resort in the
United States and that the Fed’s discount window is the primary mechanism through
which it fulfills this role. Yet, when banks faced liquidity constraints during the 2007–
2009 financial crisis (the Crisis), the discount window played a relatively small role in
providing banks much needed liquidity. This is not because banks forewent
government-backed liquidity; rather, they sought it elsewhere. First, they increased their
reliance on collateralized loans, known as advances, from the Federal Home Loan
Bank system, a little-known government-sponsored enterprise that grew in size to over
$1 trillion during the Crisis. Second, distressed banks offered exceptionally high
interest rates on insured deposits, enabling them to retain and attract funds from
depositors. As a result, Federal Home Loan Bank advances and insured deposits
served as “alternative discount windows,” standing sources of government-backed
liquidity that banks relied on as market conditions deteriorated.
In addition to drawing attention to the important and largely overlooked role that
the alternative discount windows played during the Crisis, this Article considers the
normative implications of banks’ capacity to obtain government-backed liquidity without
going to the Federal Reserve. The analysis reveals both benefits and costs. As a result
of the changing nature of banking and financial intermediation, the Fed’s discount
window alone cannot meet the liquidity needs of a modern financial system in distress.
By facilitating the transfer of additional liquidity to the market during crisis periods, the
alternative discount windows may reduce the adverse systemic consequences that arise
from liquidity shortages. Yet, there are also significant costs. In contrast to the Federal
Reserve, the Federal Home Loan Banks and insured depositors lack the incentives and
competence needed to understand the systemic consequences of their actions. As a result,
the provision of liquidity through the alternative discount windows tends to facilitate
inefficient risk taking, increase moral hazard, reduce regulatory accountability, and
compromise information generation, in addition to adversely affecting healthy banks.
This Article accordingly concludes by proposing ways to reform the underlying programs
to reduce the costs of having alternative discount windows.
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INTRODUCTION
A core function of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) is to promote
financial stability, and a primary way that the Fed furthers this aim is by acting
as the lender of last resort. Until the 2007–2008 financial crisis (the Crisis),
the Fed carried out this role through its discount window (the Discount
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Window), a standing program that enables banks to borrow from the Fed so
long as they can provide adequate collateral and meet other requirements.1 By
providing liquidity to banks in need of it, the Discount Window helps banks
avoid value-destroying fire sales and can calm financial panics.2 Nonetheless,
a close look at where banks sought liquidity during the early stages of the
Crisis reveals that the Discount Window played a surprisingly minor role in
meeting banks’ liquidity demands.3 This was true even though the Fed
actively encouraged banks to borrow through it.4 This was not, however,
because banks forewent government-backed liquidity. Instead, they sought it
elsewhere.
First and foremost, banks obtained liquidity in the form of advances
from the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) system, a
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) created to promote home ownership
by facilitating the issuance of reasonably priced mortgages.5 Second, banks
facing financial distress offered exceptionally high interest rates on insured
deposits, thus using the lure of government-backed insurance to retain and
attract funds from consumers and other investors.6 FHLBank advances and
insured deposits thus functioned as “alternative discount windows”—standing
facilities through which banks could access government-backed liquidity when
market sources ran dry.
The alternative discount windows identified here were not intended to
function as lenders of last resort. They came to this role as a result of
congressional inadvertence, market evolution, and bank opportunism.
Nonetheless, there are some benefits to having alternative discount windows.
Lack of liquidity can have devastating effects on banks and on the economy
more generally, and there are limits in the capacity of the Discount Window to
meet the liquidity needs of a modern financial system in crisis.7 The perceived
stigma associated with borrowing through the Discount Window, for
example, may discourage a bank from using it even when doing so would
benefit both the bank and the financial system.8 Similarly, the changing nature
1 There are three programs that collectively constitute the Fed’s standing liquidity facilities.
The focus here is on the primary window. See infra Part I.C.
2 This Article focuses on U.S. banks. The issues here are not unique to U.S. banks, as foreign
banks can access each of the sources of liquidity here at issue. Nonetheless, the degree to which
banks can utilize the alternative discount windows depends on the nature and extent of their U.S.
operations, imposing practical limits on their access and changign the analysis in qualitiatively
signifcant ways. See VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO.
623, HOW DO GLOBAL BANKS SCRAMBLE FOR LIQUIDITY? EVIDENCE FROM THE ASSET-BACKED
COMMERCIAL
PAPER
FREEZE
OF
2007,
at
3
(2013),
available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr623.pdf.
3 See infra Part II.A.
4 See id.
5 See infra Part II.A.I.
6 See infra Part II.A.2.
7 See infra Part IV.A.
8 See infra Part IV.A.2.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358903

JUDGE ME EDIT

104

3/7/14 9:15 AM

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.99:xxx

of banking and the rise of the “shadow banking system” give rise to liquidity
constraints that the Discount Window is not well suited to address.9 By
providing additional mechanisms for infusing liquidity into a financial system
in need of it, the alternative discount windows may help mitigate the cost of
liquidity shortages that the Discount Window is ill suited to address.
Yet there are real costs and other challenges arising from the operation
of the alternative discount windows. The parties providing liquidity through
these mechanisms have neither the incentives nor the means to ensure that
they provide liquidity only to financially healthy institutions. This significantly
increases the probability that they will provide funds to troubled banks that
have incentive to use the funds to extend excessively high-risk loans and
engage in other socially wasteful behavior. The empirical evidence supports
this concern, revealing that during the Crisis and earlier periods of distress,
financially troubled banks were more likely than others to rely on each of the
alternative discount windows.10 Similarly, access to the alternative discount
windows increases moral hazard, reducing banks’ incentives to maintain
adequate liquidity. The existence of the alternative discount windows also
reduces the quality of the information generated by Discount Window
borrowing and limits the Fed’s capacity to impose potentially useful lending
conditions, such as demanding additional information about a bank’s financial
health and risk exposures. A distinct consequence of banks’ ability to access
government-backed liquidity without going to the Fed is reduced transparency
and regulatory accountability. This may be particularly important in light of
increased public concern about the capacity of lender-of-last-resort support to
shield banks from the full consequences of their actions and otherwise
engender moral hazard.11 For these and other reasons, allowing the alternative
discount windows to persist in their current form is likely suboptimal, and this
Article suggests some reforms to improve the situation.
This Article’s primary contribution is in drawing attention to the
important and largely overlooked role that the alternative discount windows
play in providing banks access to liquidity during periods of distress, analyzing
the effects of their operation, and proposing appropriate reforms. However,
in the process of assessing the significance of having alternative discount
windows, this Article also draws attention to the need for further examination
of the Fed’s activities and prevailing norms regarding when and to whom a
modern lender of last resort should lend. The analysis here reveals significant
shortcomings in the capacity of the Discount Window to respond to the
liquidity constraints that can arise, and pose systemic risks, in today’s financial
markets. The Fed recognized many of these shortcomings during the Crisis,
and it responded by instituting a number of temporary facilities that provided

9
10
11

See id.
See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part V.B.
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liquidity to banks and other types of financial institutions outside of the
Discount Window.12 Like the alternative discount windows, these facilities
fulfilled the short-term aim of transferring additional liquidity to the market,
but they too deviated from certain longstanding norms about when, to whom,
and how a lender of last resort should lend. The Fed’s decisions to create
these facilities is directly relevant to the analysis here in helping to affirm the
shortcomings of the Discount Window and the value of having additional
mechanisms for transferring liquidity into the market. At the same time, in
assessing the effects of having alternative discount windows, this Article sheds
additional light on the trade-offs inherent in the Fed’s creation of these
temporary facilities. In so doing, it illustrates the need for further
consideration of the norms that should guide a modern-day lender of last
resort and the implications of the Fed’s actions.
A few notes about this Article’s scope: First, the Article focuses on
discount windows, that is, standing programs through which a bank facing a
liquidity shortage may, at its discretion, access liquidity that is backed by the
government and thus free from any meaningful market check on the bank’s
creditworthiness. Despite the very different mechanisms through which they
operate, both FHLBank advances and insured deposits attracted with the lure
of high interest rates fit this definition. This Article does not address the
numerous other mechanisms, including open market operations, tax breaks,
and promoting a secondary mortgage market, through which the government
transfers additional liquidity into banks and the market more generally.
Second, this Article focuses on crisis periods. Even under normal
market conditions, banks that rely on advances and deposits are shielded from
market discipline, and this Article’s analysis cannot be completely disentwined
from the moral hazard issues that are inherent in the programs underlying the
alternative discount windows. Nonetheless, there are reasons to view periods
of systemic distress as qualitatively distinct. In the presence of system-wide
liquidity constraints, many of the mechanisms through which a bank can
normally access liquidity—interbank loans, repurchase agreements, selling
loans so that they may be securitized, and the like—cease to function
normally.13 Banks’ options for obtaining needed liquidity thus change in
qualitatively significant ways. The expected social costs of banks’ access to
liquidity similarly change when more of the banks seeking liquidity are
financially distressed.14 More importantly, the underlying moral hazard issues
are well understood. Congress was aware of these trade-offs when it adopted
the underlying programs, and Congress and regulators have taken steps to
reduce the moral hazard they engender during normal periods.15 The same

12
13
14
15

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part III.B.3.
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cannot be said of the issues that arise when banks use these programs as
substitutes for the Discount Window. Thus, while this Article’s analysis has
broader implications, the focus is on periods of widespread financial distress.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I lays the groundwork,
explaining the rationale behind having a lender of last resort and theories
about when a lender of last resort should lend. It describes the reasons that
this role is generally given to a central bank and other reasons that the Fed is
institutionally well suited to play this role. It also introduces the Discount
Window, the primary mechanism through which the Fed serves as a lender of
last resort.
Part II looks at where banks sought liquidity as their access to
market-based funding declined during the Crisis. It shows that banks were
accessing government-backed sources of liquidity despite the relatively low
levels of Discount Window borrowing. Banks did so through two alternative
mechanisms—advances from FHLBanks and insured deposits attracted or
retained using the lure of exceptionally high interest rates. It further shows
that the Crisis is not the first time that banks tapped these alternative discount
windows when facing liquidity shortfalls. Part III depicts the rise of the
alternative discount windows. With respect to the FHLBanks and deposit
insurance, it explains the history giving rise to the program, the rationale for
its formation, and its evolution over time. The analysis suggests that the
capacity of each program to serve as an alternative to the Discount Window is
an unintended consequence of Congress’s attempt to address a distinct policy
aim that banks rationally exploited when given the opportunity.
Part IV examines the benefits, costs, and other consequences of the
operation of the alternative discount windows. By looking at the temporary
programs that the Fed created to supplement the Discount Window during
the Crisis, it identifies some ways that the Discount Window falls short in
response to the range of liquidity constraints that may arise in a modern
financial system. Recognizing these shortcomings allows us to see ways that
the alternative discount windows may yield meaningful welfare benefits even
if never designed to serve this role. The analysis then shifts to the costs and
other consequences of allowing the alternative discount windows to persist in
their current form. This examination suggests that the current regime is likely
suboptimal. Part V looks ahead. It considers how the insurance scheme
administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the
extension of advances by FHLBanks should be modified to reduce banks’
capacity to rely upon each when facing a liquidity shortage. It also identifies
areas that may merit further study in light of the dynamics revealed here.
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I
THE FED AS LENDER OF LAST RESORT
A. Lenders of Last Resort
Banks are inherently unstable institutions. They use short-term liabilities,
like demand deposits, to fund long-term assets, like loans to businesses and
individuals.16 This is a viable business model most of the time because the
circumstances causing one depositor to demand his money back are generally
independent of the liquidity needs of other depositors.17 This enables banks
to use fractional reserves, holding only a portion of their assets in highly liquid
forms.18 In general, this arrangement serves all involved: banks earn higher
rates of return on their assets; some portion of those returns are passed onto
depositors in the form of higher interest rates and lower fees for transaction
services; and businesses and others have greater access to capital, facilitating
economic activity and growth.
If depositors’ demands become correlated, however, this model ceases to
be viable, and the inherent instability of banks becomes manifest. When
aggregate depositor demands exceed a bank’s liquid assets, a bank can meet
those demands only by selling less liquid assets, such as loans. The need to do
so in a very short time frame, coupled with the frequent lack of an active
secondary market for those assets and information asymmetries, mean that
such “fire sales” usually occur at prices well below the fundamental value of
the asset transferred. Forced sales thus tend to reduce the value of a bank’s
assets and can render an otherwise healthy bank insolvent. Aware of this risk,
bank depositors have a rational tendency to run at any sign of trouble.19 To
reduce this inherent instability and in recognition of the welfare benefits of a
functioning banking system, the government has instituted two programs
designed to promote bank stability. The first—deposit insurance—reduces
the incentive of individual depositors to “run” on a bank, thus reducing the
likelihood that a bank will face correlated demands.20 The second—a lender
of last resort—reduces the need for a bank to engage in inefficient fire sales
and can help quell panic among depositors and others.21

16 See Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last Resort: A Review of the Literature, FIN. STABILITY REV.,
Nov. 2009, at 151, 152, [hereinafter Freixas et al., Review of the Literature] available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/fsr/1999/fsr07art6.pdf.
17 Cf. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J.
POL. ECON. 401, 402 (1983) (discussing how the demand deposit system permits efficient risk
sharing “among people who need to consume at different random times”).
18 See Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at 152.
19 Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 17, at 402–03.
20 See infra Part III.B.1.
21 Cf. Thomas M. Humphrey, The Lender of Last Resort: The Concept in History, FED. RES. BANK
RICHMOND ECON. REV., Mar./Apr. 1989, at 8, 8 (noting that the “mere announcement” of a lender
of last resort’s commitment to make a loan to an illiquid bank may, at times, “assuag[e] people’s fears
of [the bank’s] inability to obtain cash,” thereby averting a run).
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Many of the the benefits of having a lender of last resort were
recognized by Walter Bagehot in 1873, and such regimes have become a
cornerstone of most modern financial systems.22 With access to a lender of
last resort, a bank facing depositor demands in excess of its liquid reserves can
use its illiquid assets as collateral for a loan, providing the bank with the
additional liquidity it needs while enabling it to avoid value-destroying fire
sales. This helps the bank in question and also reduces the externality that
arises when one bank’s fire sales force other banks to mark down assets.23
Access to a lender of last resort can also reduce the tendency of depositors to
make correlated demands and may reduce the propensity to panic more
generally, as depositors and other creditors have little reason to run on a
solvent bank with ready access to additional liquidity.24
At the same time, access to a lender of last resort can give rise to
troubling distortions in a bank’s operations.25 One challenge is that a bank,
knowing it has ready access to a lender of last resort, has less incentive to
appropriately manage its liquidity risk and will tend to hold fewer liquid assets
than would be optimal. One tool used to deter banks from becoming overly
reliant on a lender of last resort is to force banks to pay “a penalty interest
rate” when they borrow from the lender of last resort.26
A second challenge is that as banks approach insolvency, they have an

22 See generally WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY
MARKET (Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1962) (1873) (describing the welfare benefits of having a lender of
last resort). While Bagehot was not the first to propose this notion, he has remained the figurehead
often associated with it. See Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at 151.
23 See., e.g, Ricardo J. Caballero & Alp Simsek, Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity, 68 J. FIN. 2549
(2013).
24 See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 21, at 16 (stating that one role of a lender of last resort is “to
preannounce its policy in advance of crises so as to remove uncertainty”); William C. Dudley,
President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the New York Bankers
Association's 2013 Annual Meeting and Economic Forum: Fixing Wholesale Funding to Build a
More
Stable
Financial
System
(Feb.
1,
2013)
available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/dud130201.html (stating that a lender of
last resort performs “two key functions:” first, “to provide a precautionary backstop[⎯]to reduce the
risk of a financial panic beginning in the first place by ensuring that collateral can always be financed”
and thus “reduc[ing] the risk of financial instability due to coordination problems even if the lender
of last resort is not utilized”; and second, “to prevent the fire sale[s] of assets by firms facing a
sudden loss of funding”). But see Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 17, at 417 (questioning the impact
of an available lender of last resort on depositors’ propensity to run).
25 In light of the inevitable moral hazard, some economists have suggested that central banks
should provide liquidity support solely through monetary policy and should avoid providing support
to individual institutions. See Mark A. Carlson & David C. Wheelock, The Lender of Last Resort: Lessons
from the Fed’s First 100 Years 41 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-056B,
2013), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-056.pdf (discussing this position and
its advocates).
26 BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: LECTURES BY
BEN S. BERNANKE 7 (2013); see also Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at 159
(discussing ways to counterbalance the moral hazard problem created by overreliance on liquidity
support from a lender of last resort).
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incentive to assume greater risks than are socially optimal.27 This incentive
exists even in the absence of a lender of last resort, but the challenge takes on
new dimensions when a bank has access to new sources of liquidity.28 Liquid
assets can readily be redeployed in riskier ways, like making excessively risky
loans or acquiring excessively risky assets. The most commonly invoked
maxim to address this risk, and the only one that is directly responsive, is that
a lender of last resort should lend only when an institution is facing a liquidity
problem and not a solvency one.29 More bluntly, a lender of last resort should
not lend to insolvent institutions. In practice, central banks have at times
downplayed this norm or conflated it with the notion that central banks
should only lend on good collateral.30 While this tendency may be warranted
at times, the difference between adequate collateral and solvency remains
important.31 Collateral protects the lender of last resort from experiencing any
loss if the bank to which it has extended a loan fails while the loan is
outstanding. But a bank’s ability to tender appropriate collateral merely
provides information about the types of assets that the bank holds; it provides
no information about the value of those assets relative to the bank’s liabilities.
Demanding adequate collateral thus fails to address the challenge that an
insolvent bank will tend to use new liquidity to assume socially inefficient
risks.
As the financial markets have evolved, so too have the rationales for
having a lender of last resort. The interbank market, for example, provides an
important mechanism through which a bank can access needed liquidity and
facilitates the redistribution of liquidity from banks that have it to those in
need of it.32 Additionally, more recent financial innovations, most notably
repurchase agreements, typically provide banks that have adequate and
27 See, e.g., Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to
Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1489 (1993) (“When the corporation is insolvent or at the brink of
insolvency, the difference in risk preference between shareholders and creditors is magnified with
respect to corporate investment policies. During this period of financial stress, shareholders favor
highly risky projects, even if these projects have only a slight chance of generating income large
enough to cover the firm's debt and still provide some return to shareholders.”); Asli
Demirgüç-Kunt, Designing a Bank Safety Net—A Long-term Perspective, WORLD BANK GRP.,
http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/html/designing_a_bank_sn.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014)
(noting that “excessive risk taking by banks—moral hazard—becomes worst at the time of adverse
economic shocks, which erode bank capital and increase incentives to take on more risk.”).
28 See Anna J. Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed’s Discount Window, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS
REV.,
Sept./Oct.
1992,
at
58,
65–66,
available
at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/92/09/Misuse_Sep_Oct1992.pdf.
29 See id. at 58 (noting the “ancient injunction” against lending to insolvent banks); see also
BERNANKE, supra note 26, at 7 (noting that lenders of last resort are effective at quelling runs and
ending panic only if the banks receiving injections of liquidity are actually solvent).
30 See, e.g., BERNANKE, supra note 26, at 94–95 (treating sufficient collateral and solvency as
almost interchangeable in explaining why the Fed lacked authority to bail out Lehman Brothers in
September 2008).
31 See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., Gara Afonso et al., Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis,
66 J. FIN. 1109, 1109 (2011); Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at 123.
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appropriate collateral with a ready mechanism for accessing liquidity.33 Yet
another financial innovation, securitization, has led to an active secondary
market for many types of bank loans, enabling such loans to be sold at fair
value. Nonetheless, none of these markets have proven to be a reliable source
of bank financing during periods of systemic distress.34 For example, the
opacity that envelops banks becomes particularly pronounced during periods
of distress, making it difficult for market participants to determine whether a
bank is financially sound and reducing the willingness of banks and others to
provide short-term financing.35 Similarly, banks have a rational tendency to
hoard liquidity during such periods, further impeding the efficient
redistribution of liquidity that would occur during other periods.36 As a result,
even healthy banks can face significant challenges obtaining sufficient liquidity
during periods of widespread distress.
A related issue is the fuzzy but important distinction between liquidity
and capital infusions. Capital infusions, like liquidity infusions, can be
justified from a social-welfare perspective, as the failure of a systemically
significant institution can give rise to a range of negative externalities.37
Additionally, the line separating the two can be thin, as it is not easy to
determine whether an institution is solvent and solvency is a state that can
change quite quickly. Morover, both may be viewed as a form of bailout, in
the sense that the institution relies on government support in order to
continue operations. Yet the distinction remains important. A lender of last
resort that demands adequate collateral is not necessarily putting taxpayer
dollars at risk, and the moral hazard that arises from liquidity support
introduces fewer distortions than capital support. Thus, even if both can be
justified, capital infusions raise additional concerns and thus are typically
outside the appropriate domain of a lender of last resort.
B.

The Federal Reserve
In the United States, as in most countries, the central bank is empowered

33 Repurchase agreements are effectively short-term collateralized loans structured as a sale and
repurchase of the collateral. Because repurchase-agreement counterparties receive special protections
under the Bankruptcy Code, a bank with high-quality collateral may be able to obtain funding
through these agreements even when information asymmetries otherwise limit its access to the
interbank market. See Afonso et al., supra note 32, at 1113.
34 See, e.g., id. at 1110–12 (discussing the potential unraveling of the interbank market during
crisis periods); see also VIRAL V. ACHARYA & DAVID SKEIE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF
REPORT NO. 498, A MODEL OF LIQUIDITY HOARDING AND TERM PREMIA IN INTER-BANK
MARKETS 12–17 (2011) (demonstrating how liquidity hoarding may contribute to the same).
35 See Mark J. Flannery et al., The 2007–2009 Financial Crisis and Bank Opaqueness, 22 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 55, 55–58 (2013); see also Caballero & Simsek, supra note 23 (discussing the effects
of uncertainty on lending).
36 Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned Since Bagehot?, 18 J. FIN.
SERVICES RES. 63, 66–68 (2000) [hereinafter Freixas et al., Since Bagehot].
37 E.g., Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at 158.
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to act as the lender of last resort.38 The current U.S. central bank, the Federal
Reserve System, was formed in 1913 following a series of banking crises.39
The Great Depression, and the Fed’s failure to do more to mitigate its effects,
led to an expansion of the Fed’s authority, and it altered norms regarding the
role that the Fed should play in helping banks and in using monetary policy to
respond to financial crises.40 The Fed’s statutory authority and its policy aims
have been modified further over time, including numerous changes instituted
in response to the Crisis.41 In particular, the Crisis served as a reminder, and
the Dodd-Frank Act made explicit, that one function of the Fed is “to keep
the financial system working normally and, in particular . . . to either prevent
or mitigate financial panic or financial crises.”42 This is in addition to the
Fed’s longstanding goals of promoting employment and maintaining stable
prices.43 In addition to serving as the lender of last resort, the Fed uses
monetary policy (implemented primarily through open market operations) to
further these aims.44
Congress has empowered the Fed to serve as the lender of last resort
through two distinct grants of authority.45 The primary grant of authority,
section 10B of the Federal Reserve Act, authorizes the Fed to extend loans to
member banks.46 This is the basis for the Discount Window and two related
standing programs, one for banks that do not qualify for the Discount
Window and a second for seasonal extensions of credit.47 Additionally,
38

See BERNANKE, supra note 26, at 4.
See id. at 8 (noting that “concerns about both macroeconomic stability and financial stability
motivated the decision” to create the Fed).
40 One of the harshest and most influential critiques came from Milton Friedman and Anna
Schwartz. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1867–1960, at 357–59 (1963).
41 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 41 U.S.C. (Supp.
V 2011) (limiting the Fed’s authority to extend loans to nonbanks under section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act).
42 BERNANKE, supra note 26, at 3.
43 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012).
44 See, e.g., BERNANKE, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing purchase or sale of securities on the open
market as a means of furthering the Fed’s goal of either raising or lowering short-term interest rates).
45 See Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63–43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
46 12 U.S.C. § 347b (2012) (codifying Federal Reserve Act § 10B). The relationship between
the Fed’s role as lender of last resort and its role in implementing monetary policy has evolved
dramatically since the Fed was first formed. Following the lead of the claims made by the Fed and
others regarding the effects of its lending operations, this Article assumes that such operations may
appropriately be classifed as creating liquidity. Considering that such operations are now sterilized,
whehter this is an apt characterization is questionable. See, e.g, Marvin Groodfriend & Robert G.
King, Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking (excerpts) in FINANCIAL CRISES,
CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT: A READER 145, 184-151 (Charles Goodhard &
Gerhard Illing, eds., Oxford University Press, 2002).
47 For an overview of the three programs, see Frequently Asked Questions - Discount Window
Lending Programs, FED. RES. DISCOUNT WINDOW & PAYMENT SYS. RISK,
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/dwfaqs.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=75 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
39
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pursuant to section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed may provide
liquidity to entities other than member banks under “unusual and exigent
circumstances” after determining that credit is not otherwise available and that
failure to provide the needed liquidity would adversely affect the economy.48
The Fed invoked this authority during the Crisis, the first time it had done so
since the 1930s, and the Fed’s expansive use of this authority led Congress to
narrow its scope.49 Currently, the Fed can use this authority only to establish
programs with broad-based eligibility and subject to additional conditions,
including prior approval from the Secretary of the Treasury.50
While Congress has never effectively conditioned the Fed’s authority to
lend on the solvency of the institution receiving the funds, it has scaled back
the Fed’s authority on multiple occasions in order to prevent and discourage
loans to insolvent institutions. For example, concern that the Fed had
extended loans to troubled banks during the Savings and Loan (S&L) debacle
and that those loans increased the costs borne by the FDIC in winding up
failed banks led Congress to restrict the Fed’s authority to provide support to
undercapitalized institutions.51 Similarly, in recent amendments to section
13(3), Congress formally denied the Fed the authority to provide funds to an
insolvent firm.52 Congress, however, only required that a firm be deemed
insolvent if it was actually in receivership or had filed for bankruptcy.53 In
short, Congress has signaled that the Fed should not lend to insolvent
institutions, but it has not meaningfully limited the Fed’s ability to bypass the
maxim in practice.54
Congress’s decision to have the Fed act as lender of last resort is
consistent with prevailing theory about where this authority should lie.55 A
primary reason for giving this authority to a central bank that also has control
over money supply is that the two tools can function as complements,
working together to promote aims like financial stability and growth.56
48

12 U.S.C. § 344 (2012) (codifying Federal Reserve Act § 13(3)).
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§ 1101, 124 Stat. 1376, 2114 (2010) (amending of the Federal Reserve Act § 13(3)).
50 Id.
51 See Walker F. Todd, New Discount Window Policy Is Important Element of FDICIA, BANKING
POL’Y REP., Mar. 1993, at 1, 13–16 (describing the legislative history and specific statutory changes
made to deter the Fed from lending to insolvent institutions).
52 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1101(a) (amending and
adding ¶ (B)(ii) to 12 U.S.C. § 343).
53 Id.
54 This should not be assumed to be an accident. In light of the dynamism of the financial
system and the magnitude of the social costs that can arise when a lender of last resort fails to act in a
timely fashion, it may be appropriate for the scope of the authority granted to the Fed to exceed
established norms regarding when it should appropriately exercise that authority. See Kathryn Judge,
The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft Constraints on Regulatory Authority, 76 LAW & CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS __(forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Judge, Soft Constraints].
55 See Freixas et al., Since Bagehot, supra note 36, at 71.
56 E.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES
AND
FUNCTIONS
16
(9th
ed.,
2005),
available
at
49
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Another consideration supporting such placement is that central banks,
including the Fed, tend to be relatively insulated from political influence.57
This insularity enables a central bank to take actions that might be politically
unpopular in service of long-term goals.58 Yet another rationale is that
because central banks alone have the ability to increase money supply, only
central banks lack other banks’ incentive to hoard liquidity in anticipation of
shortages to address future liquidity needs.59
A specific advantage of having the Fed serve as the lender of last resort
is that there are potential synergies between this role and the Fed’s role in
bank oversight.60 The Fed’s role as supervisor should provide it access to
information and expertise, facilitating its capacity to make timely assessments
of a bank’s financial health.61 Thus, to the extent that access to liquidity
should depend on a bank’s solvency, the Fed may be particularly well
positioned to make that determination.62
At the same time, there are drawbacks to having the Fed serve as the
lender of last resort. While the remarkable degree of independence the Fed
enjoys gives it significant leeway to focus on the long-term best interests of
the economy, that independence comes at the expense of democratic
accountability.
The Fed’s creative and aggressive use of its
lender-of-last-resort authority during the Crisis led to a new appreciation,
among members of Congress as well as the public, of just how much leeway
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf (explaining how the Fed can “cushion the
impact [of potentially threatening disturbances] on financial markets and the economy by aggressively
and visibly providing liquidity through open market operations or discount window lending”).
57 See Peter Conti-Brown, The Structure of Federal Reserve Independence 1–5 (Stanford Law Sch. &
The Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 139, 2013), available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication/431459/doc/slspublic/SSRNid2275759.pdf (demonstrating the significant independence of the Fed through a legal and
institutional analysis).
58 At the same time, this insularity can be viewed as problematic when a central bank is given
responsibilities with respect to which we might want a greater degree of accountability. See id. at 56.
59 Viral V. Acharya & Ouarda Merrouche, Precautionary Hoarding of Liquidity and Interbank
Markets: Evidence from the Subprime Crisis, 17 REV. FIN. 107, 113 (2013) (“We interpret these findings
to imply that, since acess to capital markets and wholesale borrowing in commercial paper markets
was impaired for banks . . . these weaker banks engaged in lqiuidity hoarding as a precautionary
response.”); Jose Berrospide, Liquidity Hoarding and the Financial Crisis: An Empirical Evaluation 3 (Fed.
Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Working Paper No. 2013-03, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2207754 (“[D]uring and immediately after a
severe liquidity crisis, banks hoard excess cash to self-insure against further drains of cash and to
send markets a strong message that their solvency is not at risk and that bank runs are not
justifiable.”).
60 The Fed has primary oversight responsibility for all state banks that are Fed members, bank
holding companies, and systemically important financial institutions. Other central banks often, but
not always, have some oversight authority. See Thomas Cooley et al., The Power of Central Banks and the
Future of the Federal Reserve System, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE
NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 51, 65–67 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011).
61 See id.
62 See Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1310–14 (2013) [hereinafter
Judge, Interbank Discipline] (describing the institutional competence of bank examiners).
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the Fed enjoys.63 The Crisis also made clear that the decisions the Fed makes
in its role as a lender of last resort—to whom to extend loans and on what
terms—can have significant consequences beyond promoting systemic
stability.64 This led Congress to scale back the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort
authority and sparked a broader debate about whether the Fed should
maintain its current level of independence.65 Less discussed, but also
noteworthy, is the potential for conflicts between the Fed’s role as lender of
last resort and its other roles.66
C. The Discount Window
The primary way that the Fed provides liquidity to banks in need of it is
through its Discount Window.67 All national banks and state banks that are
members of the Fed have access to the Discount Window, subject to
eligibility requirements.68 The Fed manages the credit risk associated with
loans extended through the discount window by requiring that all loans be
fully collateralized; requiring a haircut—that is, a discount on the size of the
loan relative to the value of the collateral; and, to a lesser extent, through the

63 ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE,
AND THE WORK AHEAD 348 (2013) (noting that “even Barney Frank, as smart and knowledgeable a

member of Congress as there was, expressed surprise to learn that the Fed has an essentially
unlimited pocketbook”).
64 E.g., Editorial, Questions for Mr. Geithner, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/opinion/15mon1.html?pagewanted=print (suggesting that
the failure to save Lehman led to an “impression of bias created by the disparate treatment of
Lehman and A.I.G.”); Alan Grayson, The Fed Bailouts: Money for Nothing, HUFFINGTON POST BUS.
BLOG (Dec. 5, 2011, 1:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-alan-grayson/the-fed-bailoutsmoney-fo_b_1129988.html (asserting that the Fed’s emergency lending programs allowed it to decide
which banks would fail and which ones would survive by applying inconsistent policies, specifically
with regards to asset valuation and haircuts).
65 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2009, H.R. 1207, 111th Cong. (2009)
(proposing to subject the Fed to much more stringent audit requirements); see also Pedro Nicolaci da
Costa, At Jackson Hole, a Growing Fear for Fed Independence, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2012, 5:39 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/02/us-usa-fed-politics-idUSBRE88109Q20120902
(“[O]pposition has emerged against a proactive central bank that has been forced to widen its range
of policy tools in a zero interest rate environment.”).
66 For example, when the Fed uses its lender-of-last-resort authority to extend longer-term
loans that expose it to particular types of collateral, it may have an incentive to adopt monetary
policies that would favorably affect the value of that collateral.
67 See, e.g., Cooley et al., supra note 60, at 67–68 (explaining how the discount window was used
the week after 9/11 to meet heightened liquidity needs); The Federal Reserve Discount Window, FED.
RES.
DISCOUNT
WINDOW
&
PAYMENT
SYS.
RISK
(Mar.
18,
2012),
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/discountwindowbook.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=43.
68 The Federal Reserve Discount Window, supra note 67 (limiting Primary Credit borrowing to
depository institutions with CAMELS ratings of 1, 2, or 3, or with a CAMELS rating of 4 and
“ongoing examination or other supplementary information indicates that the institution is at least
adequately capitalized and that its condition has improved sufficiently to be deemed generally sound
by its Reserve Bank”). In 2006, only 50 of 8693 reporting depository institutions were placed on the
FDIC “problem list,” signifying a CAMELS rating of 4 or 5; in 2005, 52 of 8845 instructions
received such scores; Q. BANKING PROFILE (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Arlington, Va.), Fourth
Quarter 2006, at 17 tbl.II-B, 22, available at http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2006dec/qbp.pdf.
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interest rate it charges and the eligibility requirements.69 The rate the Fed
charges on loans extended through the Discount Window is the “discount
rate.”70 Until 2003, the discount rate was set below the prevailing federal
funds rate, that is, the target rate for overnight interbank loans.71 In order to
prevent excessive borrowing, the Fed required a bank seeking funds to
demonstrate that it had a genuine need for the funds and that it lacked the
ability to obtain the necessary funds from private sources.72 Thus, if a bank
obtained financing through the Discount Window, this was a reliable
indication that the bank was unable to meet its financing needs in the market.
In an effort to reduce the stigma associated with borrowing through the
Discount Window and otherwise improve the efficacy of the program, the
Fed fundamentally revamped the structure of the Discount Window and
related facilities in 2003.73 In its revised incarnation, the program does not
require that a bank demonstrate that it lacks access to private sources of
funding before it can borrow.74 As a result, the Discount Window has
become a “no questions asked” facility.75 To counteract the risk that banks
will excessively rely on the Discount Window to meet liquidity needs, the Fed
began charging a “penalty” discount rate.76
Despite this policy change, and despite the officially confidential nature
of loans extended through the Discount Window, there continues to be a
perceived stigma attached to borrowing through the Discount Window.77
Borrowing has often been limited accordingly. Prior to the Crisis, borrowing
through the Discount Window averaged less than $200 million per day, a
remarkably small figure relative to the size of the financial system.78 A study
by Olivier Armantier and coauthors shows that during the Crisis, banks were

69 OLIVIER ARMANTIER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 483,
STIGMA IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUIDITY AUCTIONS AND DISCOUNT
WINDOW
BORROWING
DURING
THE
CRISIS
5
(2011),
available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr483.pdf.
70 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 56, at 46–48.
71 See id. at 47 (describing the history and the rationale behind the evolving policy).
72 See ARMANTIER ET AL., supra note 69, at 6.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 6–7 (explaining that “the Fed no longer establishes a bank’s possible sources of and
needs for funding to lend money under the primary credit program”).
75 Frequently Asked Questions - Discount Window Programs, supra note 47 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
76 See ARMANTIER ET AL., supra note 69, at 6.
77 See id. at 7; Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech
at the Federal Reserve Board Conference on Key Developments in Monetary Policy: The Federal
Reserve’s
Balance
Sheet;
An
Update
(Oct.
8,
2009),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20091008a.htm
(“In
August
2007 . . . banks were reluctant to rely on discount window credit [to address their funding
needs] . . . . The banks’ concern was that their recourse to the discount window, if it somehow
became known, would lead market participants to infer weakness—the so-called stigma problem.”).
78 Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve in the Early Stages of the Financial
Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 55 (2009).
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willing to pay on average an additional thirty-seven basis points in order to
avoid the Discount Window and the associated stigma, and the premium that
banks were willing to pay to avoid the Discount Window increased notably
after Lehman Brothers’s bankruptcy.79 Other findings of Armantier and his
coauthors also suggest that banks may have good reason to be concerned
about stigma.
As they note: “Although not consistently statistically
significant, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks visiting
the [Discount Window] may face a moderate increase in borrowing costs and
a moderate decrease in stock prices, relative to banks that do not visit the
[Discount Window].”80
Having established the reasons for having a lender of last resort and the
advantages of having a central bank, particularly one with the Fed’s authority
and mission, fulfill the role, the next Part reveals how the Fed’s authority may
have been unintentionally weakened by the creation of two other government
programs designed to achieve very different aims.
II
BANKS AND LIQUIDITY DURING THE CRISIS
A. The Crisis
The origins for the Crisis were laid during the housing boom of the mid2000s. The proliferation of subprime mortgages and securitization vehicles
and other investments with exposuse to subprime mortgages, combined with
significant uncertainty about the extent and distribution of such exposures, set
the stage for a dramatic pullback when questions arose regarding the value of
subprime mortgages.81 Signs that the market for subprime loans was
weakening started to appear early in 2007 and in July 2007 there was a record
downgrade of MBS backed by subprime loans.82 Yet the system remained
relatively resilient despite some localized corrections. That changed in August
2007.
On August 8, 2007, BNP Paribas announced that there had been such a
significant reduction in the liquidity of financial instruments with subprime
exposure that it could not reliably mark certain assets to market. It further

79 See ARMANTIER ET AL., supra note 69, at 3–4. Notably, and seemingly not considered by the
authors, the degree of stigma associated with borrowing through the Discount Window may have
increased in connection with the creation of TAF. See infra Part IV.A.1.
80 ARMANTIER ET AL., supra note 69, at 4.
81 Cecchetti, supra note 78, at 51.
82 Id. at 57 (explaining that the original financial crisis likely began in February 2007, but after
lenders began reporting losses, the “spreads between risky and risk-free bonds . . . began widening in
July”); see also Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Mortgage Hot Potatoes: Banks Try to Return High-Risk Loans to
the
Originators,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Feb.
15,
2007),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117150090506509262.html (highlighting the efforts of lenders to
“force mortgage originators to buy back the same high-risk, high-return loans that the big banks
eagerly bought in 2005 and 2006” in response to the weakening MBS market).
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declared that it was suspending redemptions in three of its funds as a result.83
That announcement helped trigger a panic. Investors realized that they did
not have a good understanding of the actual value of many of the MBS and
other securitized assets to which they were exposed and that those assets had
significantly greater downside risks than previously recognized.84 Investors
responded by pulling back, in unison, from such assets and investments
backed by them.85 The effects were significant and widespread.86
To understand why this announcement had such systemic ripple effects,
a little background is helpful. In the years before the Crisis, many banks had
created off-balance-sheet entities engaged in maturity transformation.87 These
entities held relatively long-term assets, such as MBS and other securitized
products, which they funded with short-term liabilities, such as commercial
paper.88 In the face of heightened uncertainty about the value of the assets
held by these entities, the investors holding the commercial paper ceased
rolling over their investments when they matured.89 The effect was similar to
a bank run, as these entities suddenly faced an acute funding shortage.90 This
forced many of the banks that had sponsored off-balance-sheet entities to
bring the entities onto their balance sheets or to find other ways to provide
them access to funding.91 Thus, while the run started in off-balance-sheet
vehicles that constituted part of the “shadow banking system,” it soon spilled
over to banks, causing many to scramble for liquidity.92

83 See, e.g., Cecchetti, supra note 78, at 57 (noting that a “complete chronology of the recent
financial crisis might start in February 2007, . . . [b]ut the definitive trigger came on August 9, 2007,
when the large French bank BNP Paribas temporarily halted redemptions from three of its funds
because it could not reliably value the assets backed by U.S. subprime mortgage debt held in those
funds”).
84 Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic
Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 699–701 (2012) [hereinafter Judge, Fragmentation Nodes]; Gary B. Gorton,
The Subprime Panic 20, 25–26 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14398, 2008).
85 Gorton, supra note 84, at 24–25; Transcript of the Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on
August 7, 2007, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. 62 (Aug. 7, 2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20070807meeting.pdf
(Geithner:
“You’re also seeing the difficulties that investors and counterparties now have in evaluating the risk
in exposure to financial counterparties, and you’re seeing in some ways reflecting all of this a
diminished willingness to finance what’s relatively high quality paper.”).
86 See Gorton, supra note 84, at 25–26.
87 See id. at 31.
88 Id. at 19.
89 Gorton, supra note 84, at 19, 24–26; Transcript of the Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee
on August 7, 2007, supra note 85, at 69.
90 See Gorton, supra note 84, at 26, 31–32.
91 Viral V. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer 32, 56 tbl.12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 15730, 2010) (finding that recourse and credit guarantees provided by
bank sponsors ended up covering 97.5% of maturing ABCP).
92 Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007, at
42–43 (May 9, 2009), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/news/conferen/09fmc/gorton.pdf
(summarizing the progression of the shadow banking panic into a more widespread panic across the
industry); see ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 2, at 35–37.
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The Fed quickly recognized that banks were experiencing problems
accessing sufficient liquidity in the market, and it made changes to the
Discount Window to encourage banks to use it as a source of liquidity. With
the stated aim of “promot[ing] the restoration of orderly conditions in
financial markets,” the Fed cut by half the spread between the discount rate
and the federal funds rate, bringing it down to fifty basis points, and extended
the duration of Discount Window loans to up to thirty days, renewable by the
borrowing bank.93 The Fed subsequently reduced the discount rate further to
a mere twenty-five basis points, and it authorized the extension of loans for
periods of up to ninety days, in addition to taking other steps to try to
encourage banks to borrow through the Discount Window.94 Yet, bank
borrowing through the Discount Window was markedly modest, with average
borrowing remaining just over $1 billion for the first seven months of the
Crisis.95
The following two sections examine how banks obtained
government-backed liquidity from sources other than the Fed.96
1.

FHLBanks

One of the most significant sources of liquidity for banks following the
August 2007 credit freeze was advances from the FHLBanks.97 This is
reflected in a study by Viral Acharya, Gara Afonso, and Anna Kovner, which
found that banks significantly changed how they funded themselves between
the second and third quarters of 2007.98 The 567 banks in their sample
increased their reliance on loans through the Discount Window by an average
of $22.7 million during this period.99 The same banks increased their use of
FHLBank advances by an average of $137.4 million.100 They find a similar
disparity when focusing solely on the banks with ABCP exposure, that is, the
banks most likely to face significant funding challenges. Such banks increased

93 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Aug. 17, 2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20070817a.htm.
94 Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (July 30,
2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_lendingdepository.htm; see also Adam
Ashcraft et al., The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The Lender of Next-to-Last Resort?, 42 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 551, 569 (2010) (noting that, among other efforts, the Fed “openly encouraged
the use of the Discount Window by identifying such use as a sign of strength during a specially
convened teleconference with a group of large banks and major investment banking firms”).
95 Cecchetti, supra note 78, at 55.
96 While not new, most of the empirical evidence that follows comes from work in which
economists sought to answer questions quite distinct from those posed here or in work that lacks the
institutional context and framing provided here.
97 See ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 2, at 17, 20–21.
98 Id. at 14–16.
99 Id. at 49 tbl.2. Two of the authors are at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; some of
the data came from a proprietary database to which they had access. These figures are based on
borrowing through the Fed’s primary discount window, excluding loans extended through secondary
credit and seasonal credit-lending programs. Id. at 20.
100 Id. at 49 tbl.2.
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their utilization of the Discount Window by an average of $124.3 million101
while increasing their use of FHLBank advances by an average of $750.8
million.102
Work by Adam Ashcraft and coauthors provides additional information
about banks’ use of FHLBank advances to meet liquidity shortages.103 They
find that between the third and fourth quarters of 2007, FHLBank advances
outstanding grew by $235 billion, a 36.7% increase, and they continued to
grow through most of 2008, reaching over $1 trillion at the end of the third
quarter of 2008.104 “[I]t was not until May 2008 that [the Fed] became the
largest government-sponsored liquidity facility in terms of crisis-related
lending to the financial system.”105 And even when the Fed did surpass the
FHLBank system “in terms of total liquidity provided, the FHLBank system
continued to be the largest lender to U.S. depository institutions” because
many of the Fed’s programs primarily benefited other types of financial
institutions or foreign banks.106 Further supporting the view that banks were
using FHLBank advances to meet short-term liquidity needs is the fact that
the level of advances outstanding declined significantly as banks gained access
to other forms of liquidity support. At the end of 2011, when market sources
of liquidity were back to normal, total FHLBank advances outstanding had
shrunk to just $418 billion.107
The evidence not only demonstrates a dramatic rise in banks’ use of
advances during the Crisis but also suggests that troubled banks were leading
this trend. A 2009 study by the FHLBanks’ regulator found that “FHLBanks
made 45% of their total advances to members characterized by relatively
weakened financial conditions.”108 The regulator further found that the
Atlanta and San Francisco FHLBanks had the highest percentages of total
assets represented by member banks with CAMELS ratings [in one of the
three lowest categories,] 3, 4, and 5—68% and 78% respectively . . . [and]
between January 2007 and September 2011, many of these poorly rated
institutions failed: 149 for the Atlanta FHLBank and 55 for the San

101

Id. There were fifty-three banks in this category.
Id.
103 See Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 551–83.
104 Id. at 552–54.
105 Id. at 553.
106 Id. at 554; see also ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 2, at 20 (showing that foreign banks obtained
more capital than U.S. banks in the early stages of the TAF program); Credit and Liquidity Programs and
the Balance Sheet, supra note 94 (summarizing the liquidity facilities instituted by the Fed, including a
number specifically targeted to depository institutions).
107 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2011, at 28 (2012), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/24009/FHFA_RepToCongr11_6_14_508.pdf.
108 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, AUDIT REPORT AUD-2012004, FHFA’S SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANKS’ ADVANCES AND
COLLATERAL
RISK
MANAGEMENT
18
(2012),
available
at
http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/AUD-2012-004.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., FHFA’S SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR FHLBS’ ADVANCES].
102
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Francisco FHLBank.109

Further evidence comes from Ashcraft and his coauthors, who found that the
five banks that most significantly increased their reliance on FHLBank
advances during the latter part of 2007 based on total dollars borrowed were
Washington Mutual, Bank of America, Countrywide, FSB, Merrill Lynch, and
Wachovia Corp., respectively.110 Of these, only Bank of America survived the
Crisis; each of the other institutions went bankrupt or was acquired (often to
avert bankruptcy).111 Also notable is the extent to which these banks
increased their use of FHLBank advances. Washington Mutual, which was
the sixth-largest bank in country when it failed in 2008, increased its advances
by $42.4 billion between the second and fourth quarters of 2007.112 By the
end of 2007, Washington Mutual had total advances outstanding of $63.9
billion, an amount representing nearly 20% of the bank’s assets.113 Even more
striking, Countrywide, which had massive subprime exposure, increased its
total advances to $47.7 billion, an amount equal to nearly 40% of the bank’s
assets at the end of 2007.114
FHLBank advances differ from Discount Window loans in a number of
ways apart from stigma and source. Both Discount Window loans and
FHLBank advances must be fully collateralized and while there is substantial
overlap in the types of collateral accepted, there are some differences, in part
because individual FHLBanks retain some discretion over the types of
collateral they will accept and the haircuts they demand.115 The FHLBanks
also enjoy another significant advantage over the Fed when loaning funds to
potentially troubled institutions—if a member bank fails, an FHLBank that
has advanced funds to the bank is given a statutory “super-lien,” putting it in
line in front of all other creditors, including the Fed and the FDIC.116
From the perspective of the borrowing bank, a distinct advantage of
using FHLBank advances is that the terms tend to be more flexible and the
duration can be substantially longer than Discount Window loans. FHLBank
advances “may be fixed or adjustable rate, with terms ranging from one day to
109

Id.
Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 560 tbl.3. “Merrill Lynch” refers to Merrill Lynch Bank USA
and Merrill Lynch Bank & Trust Co., FSB.
111 Id. Bank of America acquired both Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, Wells Fargo acquired
Wachovia, and Washington Mutual failed. Id. at 576–77.
112 Id. at 560 tbl.3; see also Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Largest Bank Failure, U.S. Seizes,
Then Sells, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A1 (recapping the federal government’s seizure and
subsequent sale of Washington Mutual to JPMorgan Chase).
113 Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 560 tbl.3.; see also SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS:
FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET FROM WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 84
(2012) (describing the way that Washington Mutual used FHLB advances to compensate for its
rapidly shrinking deposit base).
114 Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 560 tbl.3.
115 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(3) (2012) (describing eligible collateral for FHLB advances), with
Regulation A, 12 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2013) (describing collateral for Discount Window loans).
116 See 12 U.S.C. § 1430(e).
110
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30 years.”117 Looking at the cumulative evidence regarding banks’ reliance on
the Discount Window and FHLBank advances, Ashcraft and his coauthors
suggest that one reason that banks relied so much more on FHLBank
advances than the Discount Window during the early part of the Crisis was
the relatively more attractive terms of FHLBank advances.118 In their view,
“the liquidity facilities of the Federal Reserve and the FHLB System have at
the same time competed with and complemented each other.”119
2.

Deposits

Another source of liquidity that banks increasingly relied on during the
Crisis was deposits. Deposits can be categorized into two groups—insured
and uninsured.120 Both insured and uninsured deposits come from private
persons, not a government entity.121 Nonetheless, insured deposits are
appropriately deemed government-backed because FDIC insurance puts the
government on the hook financially and because a depositor knows that he
will be made whole so long as either the bank or the FDIC can perform on its
commitment.122
Hence, the government backing affects depositors’
willingness to provide a bank with funds.
A challenge in trying to assess the extent that banks relied on deposits
attracted or retained by virtue of the government backing is the lack of a
readily identifiable baseline against which to measure distortions. Deposits
tend to go down when a bank faces financial distress.123 For example,
“[d]eposit outflows [at Washington Mutual] averaged $1.2 billion a day” in the
week after another large bank failed, and averaged $750 million a day the
following week.124 The tendency for depositors to “run” is much greater for
uninsured deposits, but, as Viral Acharya and Nada Mora show, insured
deposits also tend to decline in the period prior to a bank’s failure.125 Against
this backdrop, bank efforts that reduce the rate at which deposits are

117 See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2012 (Form 10-K), at 1
(Mar.
15,
2013),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1316944/000131694413000005/a201210kfhlbsf.htm.
(describing the Bank’s “primary business” as “providing competitively priced, collateralized loans,
known as advances, to [their] members”).
118 Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 559–61.
119 Id. at 553.
120 See Viral V. Acharya & Nada Mora, Are Banks Passive Liquidity Backstops? Deposit Rates and
Flows During the 2007–2009 Crisis 2–3, chart 2 (Feb. 5, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), current version
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1972802 (tracking the differences of
insured and uninsured deposits of failed banks).
121 See
Deposit
Insurance
Summary,
FED.
DEPOSIT
INS.
CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/dis/index.html (last updated Oct. 17, 2013).
122 Id.
123 See BAIR, supra note 113, at 84.
124 Id.
125 See Acharya & Mora, supra note 120, at 31–32.
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withdrawn, like their efforts to attract new deposits, have the effect of
increasing bank liquidity relative to what it would be in the absence of such
efforts. Thus, from the perspective of a bank, insured deposits attracted or
retained with the lure of exceptionally high interest rates can function as a
substitute for going to the Discount Window.126
There is significant evidence that banks actively sought to attract and
retain deposits during the Crisis and that the most troubled banks engaged in
the most aggressive efforts. Acharya and Mora examined the interest rates
banks offered on demand and time deposits and the flows of deposits into
and out of banks during the Crisis.127 They show that banks facing financial
distress, tended to offer increasingly attractive interest rates as a way of
retaining and attracting deposits and that the “banks that raised deposit rates
were those vulnerable to liquidity risk, especially in the first year of the
crisis.”128 Additionally, “[p]remiums on deposit rates were positive in the
period leading up to a bank’s failure[;] . . . these premiums typically increased
as the bank was about to fail; [and] . . . higher deposit rates were not limited to
large time deposits, but also characterized core deposit rates.”129 They further
find that while banks faced a net outflow of deposits as they approached
failure, the trend was reversed with respect to insured deposits.130 Up until
the quarter before failure, banks, using higher interest rates as the draw, “were
able to attract insured deposit inflows.”131 Acharya and Mora’s findings thus
further illustrate that it was the government backing that enabled banks to use
higher interest rates to retain and attract funds, and so the additional liquidity
banks enjoyed may appropriately be deemed government-backed.
Overall, their findings are thus consistent “with the hypothesis that
banks about to fail experienced increasingly large deposit outflows and reacted
by raising deposit rates in an effort to stem the loss.”132 Focusing on four
large banks that failed or nearly failed during the Crisis—IndyMac,
Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and Citi—they find that the interest rate the
banks offered on 12-month CDs was on average a full 100 basis points higher
than the market average for the period, and the interest the banks offered on
60-month CDs was a full 130 basis points higher than the market average.133
Anecdotal evidence further suggests that banks’ interest-rate policies played a
meaningful role in enabling troubled banks to maintain higher levels of
deposits than they would have without efforts to exploit the value of FDIC
126 See, e.g., id. at 4–8 (noting that banks offered higher rates to attract funds and providing a
variety of explanations for deposit withdrawals when a bank, or the financial system, is facing
distress).
127 See id. at 16–22.
128 Id. at 18.
129 Id. at 17, tbl.2.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 3, chart 1b.
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insurance.134
To be sure, because of the lack of a relevant baseline, the data on banks’
interest-rate policies and deposit patterns cannot readily be translated into
figures showing the aggregate amount of funds that banks managed to attract
or retain by offering exceptionally high interest rates on insured deposits.
Additionally, the net effect on banks’ liquidity was likely significantly smaller
than FHLBank advances. Nonetheless, the evidence clearly suggests that
insured deposits were a source of liquidity that many banks, and particularly
the most troubled ones, relied on during the Crisis. And, because the deposits
were insured, there is no reason to expect that there is a meaningful
correlation between the premium that banks paid for those deposits and the
magnitude of the increased credit risk that the banks posed.
B.

Some History

The policy implications of the existence of the alternative discount
windows depends in part on whether their use was unique to the Crisis. This
subpart uses evidence from the S&L debacle to show that banks’ use of the
alternative discount windows was not an isolated phenomenon.
The roots of the S&L debacle were laid in the late 1970s and the early
1980s.135 The primary asset type held by most S&Ls was long-term residential
mortgages paying a fixed rate of interest.136 Thus, when interest rates
skyrocketed, the asset side of S&Ls’ balance sheets took a significant hit,137 as
the S&Ls were caught holding stockpiles of long-term mortgages paying
below-market interest rates. At the same time, rising interest rates and the rise
of money market mutual funds made it difficult for S&Ls to retain deposits
without offering interest rates that far exceeded what they were earning on
their assets.138 The net income for the industry fell from “$781 million in
1980 . . . to negative $4.6 billion and $4.1 billion in 1981 and 1982.”139
Nonetheless, in part because policymakers believed that the insolvent S&Ls
could recover, the initial regulatory and congressional responses to the S&L
debacle entailed numerous policies that allowed insolvent institutions to
134 For example, an informal conversation with a hedge fund manager revealed that he had
moved $1 million into demand accounts (in his name and on behalf of immediate family) with a
little-known bank because the accounts paid an interest rate that was nearly 100 basis points above
Treasuries. He had no faith in the bank, but had used a tool on the FDIC’s website to ensure that he
structured the accounts so that all were fully insured.
135 See Michael Waldman, The S&L Collapse: The Cost of a Congress for Sale, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 47, 48 (1990).
136 Alane Moysich, The Savings and Loan Crisis and Its Relationship to Banking, in 1 FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 167, 168 (1997).
137 Id.
138 The interest rates being paid by S&Ls fluctuated in part in response to changing government
policies, including the imposition of an interest rate cap in 1966 and the gradual removal of that cap
between 1980 and 1986. See id. at 172–73 (explaining the fluctuation of interest rates due to various
government regulations).
139 Id. at 168.
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remain in operation and tended to expand the range of activities in which they
could engage.140 The S&L debacle is relevant here because both insured
deposits attracted with the promise of above-market interest rates and FHLB
advances were among the sources of financing that troubled S&Ls relied on
to fund their operations.
The effects of efforts by troubled thrifts to attract deposits with the lure
of high interest rates were most dramatic in the geographic regions with the
most troubled S&Ls, with Texas being the lead example. By year-end 1987,
forty-four percent of insolvent S&Ls were based in Texas.141 The dire
condition of these institutions limited their ability to access market-based
sources of liquidity and gave them an incentive to exploit government-backed
deposits to the greatest extent practical, which they did by offering
exceptionally high interest rates on deposits.142 Moreover, the high interest
rates being offered by the Texas S&Ls attracted depositors away from other
Texas institutions, including well-capitalized thrifts and other banking
institutions.143 In response, these solvent, well-capitalized institutions were
forced to offer depositors “the so-called Texas premium” in order just to
retain their funding base. At its highest, in 1987, the Texas premium was
estimated to be at least fifty basis points.144 These premiums persisted until
Congress adopted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), finally providing regulators the capital
necessary to close all of the troubled institutions.145 Thus, the S&L debacle
reveals an important collateral consequence of banks’ using higher interest
rates to attract deposits as they approach insolvency—the adverse effect on
healthy banks competing for those deposits.146
Troubled thrifts also relied on FHLBank advances to continue
operations when facing challenges accessing sufficient liquidity in the market.
One study shows, for example, that
of the 205 failed thrifts that were resolved . . . in 1988 . . . 76 percent
borrowed from their FHLBank three years before closure [and] some of
these thrifts financed about 72 percent of their total assets with FHLBank
loans. By contrast, only 40 percent of their solvent counterparts borrowed
from FHLBanks at the end of 1988

140

Id. at 172–77 (describing various government action taken in response to the S&L debacle).
Id. at 183.
142 Id. at 176 & n.27, 181–82.
143 GENIE D. SHORT & JEFFERY W. GUNTHER, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., THE TEXAS
THRIFT SITUATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TEXAS FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 6–7 (1988); Texas
Marketers Battle High Rates and Bad Publicity: Emphasis on Service, Safety and Lower Rates Begins to Pay Off,
SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, Sept. 1988, at 84.
144 Moysich, supra note 136, at 183.
145 Id. at 183–84.
146 Acharya & Mora, supra note 120, at 2 (quoting then-CEO and chairman of Bank of America
Kenneth D. Lewis as saying, “The fact that Washington Mutual is now owned by Chase is very
positive, because they were a huge outlier on rates.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
141
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and the typical amount borrowed was lower for solvent thrifts.147 The study
further found that “[b]oth nationwide and in five of the six states [that
accounted for the largest share of costly resolutions of failed thrifts], insolvent
thrifts . . . borrowed proportionately more from FHLBanks than solvent
institutions.”148 The study’s authors conclude: the “results suggest that
FHLBank advances were used more by financially distressed thrift institutions
than by other firms”; FHLBank advances “may have added to the cost of
resolving failed thrifts during the 1980s and early 1990s, contributing to one
of the most expensive bailouts in U.S. history”; “[b]y insulating [thrifts] from
market discipline, FHLBank advance programs provide incentives for thrifts
to take more risk”; and “value-maximizing troubled thrifts will tend to borrow
more, . . . [t]hus, access to FHLBank advances provides benefits to financially
distressed institutions.”149
While the S&L debacle may appropriately be deemed something less
than a full financial crisis, it was the core of the largest wave of bank failures
prior to the Crisis.150 That banks, particularly those facing distress, tended to
rely on insured deposits attracted with high interest rates and FHLBank
advances to meet their liquidity needs during this period illustrates that these
tendencies are not limited to the Crisis.151 This suggests that the presence of
the alternative discount windows as standing programs that banks can use to
access liquidity is likely to pose a persistent challenge that will not go away
without intervention.
III
HOW DID THIS HAPPEN?
There are meaningful differences between the two programs giving rise
to each of the alternative discount windows identified here. In order to
explore the significance of banks’ reliance on each, this Part considers the
origins of each program, the aims they were designed to achieve, and how
they have evolved over time.

147 Lisa K. Ashley et al., Access to FHLBank Advances and the Performance of Thrift Institutions, FED.
RES. BANK CHI. ECON. PERSP., 2nd Quarter 1998, at 33, 33.
148 Id. at 40, 41 tbl.6.
149 Id. at 47; see also Dusan Stojanovic et al., Is Federal Home Loan Bank Funding a Risky Business for
the
FDIC?,
REGIONAL
ECONOMIST,
Oct.
2000,
https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=482
(describing ways that FHLBank
advances can increases FDIC losses).
150 See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 28 (5th ed.
2013) (referring to the bank failure rates during the S&L crisis as “unequaled” since the Great
Depression, but stating that the banking industry “returned to financial health” after the end of the
S&L crisis in the 1990s and thus was not a full-blown financial crisis.).
151 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–221,
§ 103, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (2012)) (amending the term
“depository institution” to include “any insured bank as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act”).
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A. FHLBanks
1.

History

The FHLBank system consists of twelve regional banks and a central
body that coordinates the issuance of debt, which constitutes the primary
source of funds for the FHLBanks.152 Formed in 1932, the FHLBank system
was the first GSE designed to help Americans realize the dream of home
ownership.153
At that time, banking institutions were divided into
meaningfully distinct breeds. Commercial banks specialized in providing
businesses access to capital while thrifts specialized in satisfying the credit
needs of ordinary Americans, which included providing home loans.154
Generally organized as mutual organizations rather than for-profit institutions,
thrifts “sought social uplift, not private gain.”155 Against this backdrop,
Congress reasonably concluded that one way to promote home ownership
would be to provide thrifts access to a stable and competitively priced source
of funding, which they could then use to extend home loans. FHLBank
advances fulfill this function, and providing advances has remained the
primary role played by FHLBanks.156 While FHLBank advances have always
tended to be longer term than Discount Window loans and were designed to
achieve a distinct aim, there was a parallel between the two regimes. This was
particularly true during the decades prior to 1980, when thrifts lacked access
to the Discount Window.157
In the period since the FHLBank system was first instituted, two
developments have largely elided what had been the critical distinction
between commercial banks and thrifts. First, beginning in the 1980s,
lawmakers significantly expanded the range of activities permissible for thrifts,
enabling them to engage in activities far removed from extending home
loans.158 Second, commercial banks started to extend home loans, taking over
a significant portion of the market.159 These developments significantly

152

See Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 555–56, 559 fig.1.
Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. 72–304, 47 Stat. 725, 725 (1922) (creating the
FHLBank system and providing for supervision thereof); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 150, at 14
(stating that the thrift industry arose to help Americans “of modest means” own homes).
154 See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 150, at 14 (observing that thrifts developed to help ordinary
Americans whereas banks had traditionally “serv[ed] the needs of commerce.”).
155 See id. at 14.
156 The
Federal
Home
Loan
Banks:
The
Basics,
FHLBANKS
2–3,
http://www.fhlbanks.com/assets/pdfs/sidebar/FHLBanks_TheBasics_4_2012.pdf (last visited Feb.
7, 2014).
157 See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96–221, tit. II, 94 Stat. 132, 142–45 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.
(2012)) (extending Discount Window eligibility to thrifts).
158 See Waldman, supra note 135, at 48.
159 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-489T, FEDERAL HOME LOAN
BANK SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW OF CHANGES AND CURRENT ISSUES AFFECTING THE SYSTEM 3,
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/111492.pdf (“[C]ommercial banks now account
153

JUDGE ME EDIT

2014]

3/7/14 9:15 AM

THREE DISCOUNT WINDOWS

127

weakened the relationship between providing advances to thrifts and the
ability of consumers to obtain home loans on reasonable terms. They also led
a number of commentators to suggest that the FHLBank system should be
eliminated or substantially restructured to tighten the relationship between the
government support provided to the FHLBanks and the aim of promoting
home ownership.160 Nonetheless, while Congress did make changes to the
FHLBank system following these developments, those changes worked in the
opposite direction—they expanded the FHLBank system in a way that further
attenuated the relationship between the services it provides and its original
aims. Congress’s reasons for doing so can only be understood in context.
In 1989, Congress recognized that it needed to resolve the S&L debacle
and that it was going to be costly to do so. After numerous botched attempts
to resolve the situation without providing adequate financial support to wind
down the insolvent thrifts, Congress had come to appreciate that trying to
avoid the costs of a bailout would only increase the government’s eventual
bill.161 Nonetheless, Congress was far from eager to have taxpayers directly
foot the full $50 billion, the amount that the Bush administration suggested
was necessary to shut down the remaining insolvent thrifts.162 Accentuating
Congress’s general hesitance was its desire to honor the fiscal discipline
imposed by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit-reduction targets.163 Thus,
leading members of Congress and other prominent experts, including then–
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan and then–Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady,
endorsed finding a way to fund the S&L clean up “off-budget.”164 Long
controversial, off-budget financing entails borrowing or lending by a federally
related entity that is not included in the federal budget.165 This includes the
FHLBanks and, until they were put into conservatorship in 2008, the other
for more than 70 percent of all [FHLBank] System members . . . .”).
160 See, e.g., Proposals to Improve the Regulatory Regime for Government Sponsored Enterprises: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 13–16 (2004) (statement of
Richard S. Carnell, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law), available at
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=386fbcae4798-4aa2-ab91-f56702bd9a11 (recommending GSE reform); Ashley et al., supra note 147, at 33
(explaining that the evolution of the mortgage market since the FHLBank system was created
“raise[d] the question whether there is a need for a government-sponsored liquidity facility for
real-estate-specialized lending institutions”).
161 See Dirk S. Adams, Rodney R. Peck & Jill W. Spencer, FIRREA and the New Federal Home
Loan Bank System, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 17, 45–51 (1992) (describing the earlier congressional
actions and the failure of each).
162 See Kenneth Ryder, A Guide to FIRREA’s Off-Budget Financing, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 82,
82 (1990).
163 Id. at 89 n.3 (“The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub.L. No.
99–177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985), as amended . . . established specific limits on the size of the federal
deficit in each . . . year[]” leading up to 1993, when it was to reach zero).
164 See Geoffrey A. Campbell, Treasury Chief Says House Thrift Plan Will Boost Costs, Weaken
Discipline, BOND BUYER, July 11, 1989, at 4; Margaret Soares, FSLIC BAILOUT: Does Washington
Know What It’s Doing? Bush’s Thrift-Rescue Plan Receives Poor Reviews from Wall Street, BOND BUYER, Apr.
28, 1989, at 1A.
165 Ryder, supra note 162, at 83.
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GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.166
In order to “honor” the deficit reduction target, the final S&L bill,
FIRREA, mandated a complex two-entity structure for winding down defunct
thrifts.167 The first entity, the Resolution Trust Corporation, was a federal
agency with federal employees.168 Managed by the FDIC, it had full
responsibility for winding down the failing thrifts.169 The second entity,
RefCorp, was a financial intermediary with no employees that existed solely to
provide the Resolution Trust Corporation with the funds necessary to cover
insured deposits and other expenses associated with closing down insolvent
thrifts.170 Those funds came from the capital contributions that the
FHLBanks and thrifts were required to make pursuant to FIRREA and from
the issuance of $30 billion in RefCorp bonds.171 In addition to investments
acquired with the original capital contributions, the bonds were to be paid off
with proceeds from the sale of assets of failed thrifts and further
contributions from the FHLBanks, with Treasury serving as a backstop if
other sources proved insufficient.172
In short, the FHLBanks played a critical role in keeping the majority of
the funds required to resolve the S&L debacle off-budget. The FHLBanks
thus became useful to Congress for reasons quite apart from their role in
facilitating home ownership.173 In this light, it is less surprising that Congress
did not view FIRREA as an opportune time to eliminate or substantially
shrink the FHLBank system despite the increasingly attenuated relationship
between the services it provides and its original function. Notably, Congress
not only allowed them to persist but also significantly expanded their
membership in a way that further attenuated that relationship. In so doing,
Congress also increased the FHLBanks’ expected revenue, thus increasing
their capacity to pay the interest owed on the RefCorp bonds. Most
significantly, FIRREA authorized commercial banks to become members of
the FHLBank system, subject only to the requirement that the bank meet
certain (relatively weak and subsequently weakened) thresholds regarding its
involvement in extending residential loans.174 Congress has also made other
166

See id. at 83–84.
See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101–73, §§ 501, 511, 103 Stat. 183, 363–394 (1989).
168 See Ryder, supra note 162, at 83, 85.
169 See id. at 83–85.
170 See id. at 84–85.
171 See id. at 82–83, 90 n.12.
172 Id. at 85.
173 See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Announces Completion of RefCorp
Obligation and Approves FHLB Plans to Build Capital (Aug. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/21861/refcorp080511.pdf (observing that the FHLBanks paid off the
RefCorp bond obligations in full in 2011).
174 See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101–73, § 704, 103 Stat 183, 415–16 (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (2012));
Stojanovic et al., supra note 149 (explaining that with the changes effectuated by
167
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changes to the FHLBank system, including expanding the range of services it
provides to member banks.175 Nonetheless, providing advances remains their
primary activity, and individual FHLBanks continue to identify “enhanc[ing]
the availability of credit for residential mortgages and economic development
by providing a readily available, competitively priced source of funds for
housing and community lenders” as their primary function.176
The net result has been to dramatically increase the size of the FHLBank
system, and thus the value of government subsidy the system receives, even as
its reason for its existence has become increasingly questionable as a policy
matter.177 According to one study by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office,
the FHLBank system enjoyed $3.4 billion and $3.6 billion in implicit federal
support and tax savings in 2003 and 2002, respectively.178 Of these amounts,
just $200 million and $300 million accrued to the benefit-conferring mortgage
borrowers, with the remainder captured by the FHLBanks and their
stakeholders, including member banks.179
2.

Structure and Function

Also relevant to the significance of banks’ ability to use FHLBank
advances in lieu of borrowing through the Discount Window are the
institutional competence and structure of the FHLBank system. While the
original structure of the FHLBanks bears some resemblance to the Fed—
twelve regional banks with a coordinating body based in Washington, D.C.—

Gramm-Leach-Bliley, “nearly all of the nation’s thrifts and commercial banks” would be eligible to
become a member of the FHLBank system). Insurance companies are now also eligible to become
FHLBank members. 12 U.S.C. § 1424(a).
175 One way the FHLBanks clearly further the aim of supporting affordable housing is by
complying with their statutory obligation to contribute the larger of $100 million or ten percent of
net earnings to an affordable housing program each year. See Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 §721.
176 Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2011 (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 14,
2012) (italics added); see also Regulatory Reform of the Housing Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (statement of Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Office) (explaining that while engaged in a variety of
activities, the “Federal Home Loan Banks are primarily in the business of borrowing in the capital
markets and lending to member institutions, including banks”); Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 556
(“Advances constitute 68.8% of the FHLB System’s $1,349.1 billion in total assets” as of December
31, 2008).
177 Pursuant to its statutory mandate, the FHLBanks are only authorized to provide long-term
advances “for the purposes of . . . providing funds to any member for residential housing finance [or]
providing funds to any community financial institution for small businesses, small farms, small
agri-businesses, [or] community development activities.”
12 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(2) (2012).
Nonetheless, given the inherent fungibility of capital, there is no meaningful way for FHLBanks to
enforce this and little indication that they have made any effort to do so.
178 See DEBORAH LUCAS & DAVID TORREGROSA, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED
ESTIMATES OF THE SUBSIDIES TO THE HOUSING GSES 10 tbl.5 (2004),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/53xx/doc5368/04-08-gse.pdf.
179 Id.
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the two systems are quite different in operation.180 The regional banks of the
Fed continue to play a number of important roles, particularly on the
operational front, but the Board of Governors or the Federal Open Market
Committee make virtually all of the important policy decisions.181 Thus, a
body in which the majority, and often all, of the members have been
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate approves all
significant policy decisions.182 Moreover, while each of the regional banks is
structured as a mutual organization and thus is “owned” by member banks,183
any profits earned by the Federal Reserve System are turned over to the
Treasury at the end of each year.184 The Fed is thus a largely centralized
system designed to achieve clearly articulated public policy aims under the
oversight of political appointees.
The FHLBank system has a very different structure. There is some
degree of coordination, but most of it centers on the issuance of
“consolidated obligations,” the joint and several debt obligations that funds
most of the FHLBanks’ operations.185 Moreover, while subject to federal
oversight by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, each FHLBank enjoys, and
exercises, significant independence, and there is relatively little coordination
among them.186 Additionally, the majority of the members on the board of
directors for each FHLBank are officers or directors of member banks.187
The FHLBank system is further distinguished from the Fed in that any profits
earned by FHLBanks, including those derived from direct and indirect
government subsidies, are passed on as dividends to member banks.188 The

180

See supra Part I.B (discussing the Fed’s general structure and operations).
See The Structure of the Federal Reserve System: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri.htm (last
updated July 8, 2003).
182 See id.
183 See Who Owns the Federal Reserve?, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_14986.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2013).
184 The Structure of the Federal Reserve System: Federal Reserve Banks, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES.
SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri3.htm (last updated Apr. 17, 2009).
185 Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 556. This is done by the FHLBanks Office of Finance.
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FHFA’S SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR FHLBS’ ADVANCES,
supra note 108, at 7 n.8.
186 See Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 557 (noting that the federal government regulates the
FHLBanks for “safety and soundness” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Investor Relations, FED.
HOME LOAN BANK S.F., http://www.fhlbsf.com/about/investor/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 7,
2014) (noting that “[e]ach FHLBank is a separate entity, with its own board of directors,
management, and employees”).
187 12 U.S.C. § 1427 (2012).
188 The favorable tax status of the bonds they issue, the lower yield they must pay on those
bonds because of the implicit government backing, and the statutory protections FHLBanks enjoy
when they have advances outstanding to a member bank that fails are among the benefits the
government confers on FHLBanks. See Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 556–57. The dividends paid
to members can be significant. See, e.g., Investor Relations, supra note 186 (noting that between 2003
and 2008, the FHLBank of San Francisco paid its members dividends at annualized rates ranging
from 3.93% to 5.41%).
181
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FHLBank system is thus significantly more private, less publicly accountable,
and less centralized than the Fed.
Another important distinction between the FHLBanks and the Fed
arises from how they fund their lending operations. Through the early stages
of the Crisis, the Fed lent out cash primarily by selling U.S. Treasuries or not
replenishing its portfolio as issues matured.189 It was not until the failure of
Lehman Brothers that the Fed could no longer balance its liquidity injections
in this manner, at which point Treasury instituted a supplementary financing
program to support the Fed’s activities.190 By contrast, the FHLBanks
required new capital in order to meet members’ rising demands for advances,
which they could obtain only by issuing new debt and requiring members to
acquire additional stock.191 Market expectations that the government would
stand behind GSE debt enabled the FHLBanks to access capital on relatively
favorable terms during the early stages of the Crisis.192 Nonetheless, as the
spread between GSE debt and Treasuries started to widen in mid-2008,
capital became more costly for the FHLBanks.193 Thus, as recognized by
Ashcraft and his coauthors, “events in 2008 revealed . . . [that] relying on
market funding using an implicit government guarantee is unlikely to be
sufficient for a lender of last resort to be entirely effective during a financial
crisis—exactly when you need one most.”194
B.

The FDIC
1.

Deposit Insurance

Deposit insurance is another byproduct of the Great Depression. The
Banking Act of 1933 instituted a regime for insuring deposits and created the
FDIC to administer the insurance fund and oversee insured state banks that
are not members of the Fed.195 Deposit insurance serves a number of related
goals. The primary rationale for deposit insurance is to improve bank stability
by discouraging runs.196 Because depositors who are first in line get paid in
full and those who delay can end up receiving less than the full amount the
bank owes them, depositors will rationally run in the face of trouble even if
189

Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 578.
Id.
191 Id. at 577–78.
192 See id. at 554, 560.
193 Id. at 579.
194 Id.
195 DIV. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., A BRIEF HISTORY OF
DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 2 (1988) [hereinafter FDIC, HISTORY OF DEPOSIT
INSURANCE]. A number of states had instituted deposit-insurance regimes prior to the Great
Depression, but, with the exception of Texas, no state had sufficient funds to make all depositors
whole as bank closures spread in the 1920s and 1930s. Id. at 12–16.
196 See id. at 20 (noting that as confidence in the banking system eroded, runs on banks became
more common). After the implementation of federal deposit insurance, runs on banks decreased,
indicating that public confidence had increased. Id. at 34. See supra Part I.A.
190
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they believe their bank to be solvent.197 By assuring depositors that they will
be paid in full, deposit insurance discourages bank runs and increases bank
stability.
A related function of deposit insurance is to protect depositors. Voters’
desire for deposit insurance is credited with playing a significant role in its
adoption in 1933, and consumer protection remains a core concern animating
many aspects of banking regulation.198 Yet another rationale for deposit
insurance, coupled with the grant of oversight authority in a governmental
regulator, is efficiency based. There is little evidence that small individual
depositors can effectively monitor a bank’s financial health, and it would be
exceptionally time consuming for each to do so.199 Deposit insurance frees
small depositors from this task, placing it instead in the hands of a specialized
regulator who can more efficiently monitor and discipline the bank.
Today, FDIC insurance covers a range of account types, including
money market deposit accounts and certificates of deposit, in addition to
checking and savings accounts, up to the insured limit of $250,000.200 The
limit applies to enumerated account types, per insured bank, so it is possible
for a depositor to enjoy protection in excess of this limit depending on how
she structures her accounts.201 Insured deposits primarily represent a
relationship between the bank and the depositor, and it is those parties who
determine whether a depositor will provide funds to a bank and on what
terms. Thus, in contrast to the FHLBanks and the Fed, the FDIC is not the
one providing the liquidity in the discount window enabled by the insurance
fund it administers. As a result, the policy analysis of this window depends on
the tools that the FDIC has to control the terms that a bank offers to
depositors and depositor incentives rather than on the governance structure
of the FDIC. The next two sections address those issues in turn.
2.

The FDIC and Deposits

The FDIC has very little control over the interest rates banks offer on
deposits, insured or otherwise. Historically, the interest rates banks could
offer on insured deposits were capped at a statutory maximum.202 Statutory
197

Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 17, at 402–03.
FDIC, HISTORY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE, supra note 195, at 25–27 (describing how Senator
Carter Glass, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee and a leading proponent of
banking reform, had been opposed to deposit insurance, but he and others were swayed by public
opinion).
199 Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at 153; see also MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT &
JEAN TIROLE, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANKS 5–6 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. 1994) (1993)
(“Small depositors have neither the incentive nor the competence to collect information or to
intervene into bank management.”).
200 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 335, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(a)(1)(E) (2012).
201 Deposit
Insurance
Summary,
FED.
DEPOSIT
INS.
CORP.
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/dis/index.html (last updated Oct. 17, 2013).
202 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (1986), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/7500198
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caps were removed, however, when banks began losing substantial funds to
money market funds,203 and there are advantages to allowing rates generally to
be determined in a competitive market without extensive government
intervention.204 In response to banks’ abuse of insured deposits during the
S&L debacle, Congress has placed limits on the interest rates that an insured
institution can offer on brokered deposits.205 But because the Internet and
other technologies enable banks to attract new depositors without relying on
brokers, this limitation does not suffice to address the challenge as it exists
today. Moreover, in its implementing rules, the FDIC exempts “well
capitalized banks,” so most banks enjoy complete discretion over their
interest-rate policies.206 More generally, while the FDIC’s control over a
bank’s operations tends to increase significantly when a bank is not adequately
capitalized, experience has shown that capitalization ratios are lagging
indicator, so these additional control mechanisms provide the FDIC limited
ability to address the dynamics revealed here.207
3.

Moral Hazard

Despite widespread support, deposit insurance has generated significant
controversy. Because depositors are assured that they will receive 100% of
their funds up to the statutory limit, they have little incentive to monitor their
bank’s financial health. Hence, a bank engaging in reckless behavior can
attract capital from depositors on terms that do not reflect the riskiness of the
bank’s activities. This moral hazard increases along with the amount of
coverage provided and thus is greater today than it was prior to the Crisis,
when accounts were insured only up to $100,000.208 Moreover, because a
bank’s shareholders often benefit from a bank assuming excessive risk,

1600.html (promulgating Regulation Q).
203 R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It Passed Away, FED. RES.
BANK
S T.
LOUIS
REV.,
Feb.
1986,
at
22,
30,
available
at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/86/02/Requiem_Feb1986.pdf.
204 See id. at 34–35 (enumerating problems arising from Regulation Q caused, including creating
challenges for depository institutions, discriminating against small savers, and failing to increase
residential mortgage credit); Scott Winningham, The Effects of Removing Regulation Q—A Theoretical
Analysis, FED RES. BANK KANS. CITY ECON. REV., MAY 1980, at 13, 23, available at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/ECONREV/econrevarchive/1980/2q80winn.pdf
(summarizing the effects of removing Regulation Q, including increasing GNP and decreasing
volatility in market interest rates).
205 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(e) (2012) (restricting the interest that banks may pay on “funds obtained,
directly or indirectly, by or through a deposit broker”).
206 12 C.F.R. § 337.6 (2013).
207 E.g., Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act of
1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 351 (1993).
208 Id. at 320; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 406–07
(“[M]oral hazard encourages banks to assume greater risks whenever capital requirements and
deposit insurance premiums do not compel banks to internalize the risk-related costs of their
activities.”).
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deposit insurance can subsidize and incentivize banks’ risk taking.209
Congress has sought to address this risk, most directly by mandating that
the premium a bank pays for deposit insurance reflect the riskiness of that
bank’s activities.210 By forcing banks to internalize the costs of their risk
taking, such a regime should address both the subsidy and incentive issues. In
practice, risk-based deposit insurance has proven incredibly difficult to
implement, and most banks underpay for the coverage they receive.211 A
persistent challenge is that the information on which a bank’s current
premium is based is almost always stale. Given the rapidity with which banks
can reallocate assets in ways that significantly change their risk profile and
how quickly asset prices can change, this issue becomes even more difficult
during periods of systemic distress. Thus, risk-based premiums do not
alleviate, and may do little to reduce, the ability of troubled banks to use
insured deposits as a source of liquidity and to reallocate the funds so received
in troubling ways.
IV
ASSESSING THE ALTERNATIVE DISCOUNT WINDOWS
This Part assesses some consequences of the current regime. It
examines, in turn, the benefits, costs, and other effects of allowing the
alternative discount windows to continue to operate in their current forms.
A. Benefits
One model of regulatory behavior assumes that regulators seek to
maintain and increase their influence. In this frame, the Fed’s apparent
acquiescence to the developments described here may seem surprising. A
closer look at the context in which the Fed was operating, however, suggests a
more complex account. During the Crisis, the Fed created a number of
temporary mechanisms for infusing liquidity into banks and other financial
institutions.212 The creation and terms of these programs reflect the Fed’s
recognition that the Discount Window alone did not suffice to meet the
liquidity needs of the financial system. The Fed’s decision to create these
facilities and the structures of each also reflect the nature of the Discount
Window’s shortcomings. As a result, looking at the other facilities the Fed
formed sheds light on ways that the alternative discount windows may yield
209 E.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Solving the Corporate Governance Problems of Banks:
A Proposal, 120 BANKING L.J. 326, 328 (2003) (“[T]he implementation of deposit insurance poses a
regulatory cost of its own—it gives the shareholders and the managers of insured banks incentives to
engage in excessive risk taking.”).
210 See FDIC, HISTORY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE, supra note 195, at 54; see also Carnell, supra
note 207, at 358–59 (explaining that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 introduced a risk-based premium system).
211 E.g., Wilmarth, supra note 208, at 266–67 (describing why most banks pay too little for
deposit insurance).
212 See infra Part IV.A–B.
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social benefits. At the same time, public scrutiny of the Fed’s actions reveals
why the Fed may be perfectly content to allow the alternative discount
windows to persist, as their operations may reduce the amount of lending the
Fed must undertake and defend. This subpart provides a brief introduction to
these programs and some of the limitations inherent in the Discount Window,
as revealed by the Fed’s actions. It then considers the capacity of the
alternative discount windows to overcome these shortcomings and otherwise
promote socially desirable aims.
1.

The Fed’s Actions During the Crisis

The Fed recognized early in the Crisis that despite its numerous efforts
to encourage banks to borrow through the Discount Window, utilization
seemed significantly below the optimal level in light of the ongoing liquidity
constraints in the market.213 In order to facilitate the transfer of additional
liquidity, the Fed created a number of temporary facilities that banks and,
subsequently, other financial institutions could use to obtain collateralized
loans from the Fed. The first such facility, the Term Auction Facility (TAF),
was available only to banks that could also access the Discount Window and
was adopted under the same authority pursuant to which the Fed operates the
Discount Window.214 The primary rationale for instituting this facility was a
fear that banks were underutilizing the Discount Window because of the
associated stigma.215 Thus, in addition to simply being a new facility and thus
free from historical baggage, the TAF was structured to minimize the
possibility that usage would signal bank distress.216
Notably, because it was available to the same banks, using the same
collateral, the TAF likely affected the amount banks subsequently borrowed
through the Discount Window. More specifically, the funds transferred from
the Fed to banks through the TAF consisted of (1) liquidity transfers that
otherwise would have occurred through the Discount Window, and
(2) liquidity transfers that would not have occurred but for the TAF, so the
creation of the TAF likely reduced Discount Window borrowing.217 Both
213 See Transcript of the Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on September 18, 2007, BOARD
GOVERNORS
FED.
RES.
SYS.
128
(Sept.
18,
2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20070918meeting.pdf (Bernanke: “Are
there ways to provide liquidity that would help normalize money markets, particularly term money
markets, and would allow banks to make use of the enormous amount of collateral they have at the
discount window, but would avoid the stigma and create a more efficient system?”).
214 For a description of the TAF structure, see ARMANTIER ET AL., supra note 69, at 7–8.
215 E.g., Transcript of the Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on September 18, 2007, supra
note 215, at 128 (Bernanke: “The solution that the staff came up with [to enable banks to use
Discount Window eligible collateral to secure liquidity without bearing the perceived stigma of
borrowing through the Discount Window] was to have an auction facility that would essentially set
an endogenous price and, because it was an auction, it might look more like a good business
proposition rather than like a move of desperation and, therefore, would not have the same stigma.”).
216 Id.
217 See ARMANTIER ET AL., supra note 69, at 3–4.
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because the increased use of the Discount Window that would likely have
occurred without the TAF may have reduced the associated stigma and
because the existence of a parallel program specifically designed to signal a
lack of desperation may have exacerbated the degree of desperation signaled
by borrowing through the Discount Window, the TAF may best be viewed as
both reflecting and accentuating the stigma associated with the Discount
Window.
As the Crisis deepened, the Fed became increasingly aggressive in its
creation of temporary mechanisms for transferring additional liquidity to the
market. Following the near failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008, the Fed
instituted the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, which provided overnight loans
in exchange for a specified range of eligible collateral, and the Term Securities
Lending Facility, which provided Treasury securities in exchange for less
liquid collateral for twenty-eight-day periods.218 In contrast to the TAF, the
institutions eligible to participate in these programs were not banks otherwise
eligible to use the Discount Window; they were primary dealers, that is, the
financial institutions that serve as trading counterparties to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York in its implementation of monetary policy.219 This
was possible because these programs were adopted pursuant to section 13(3)
of the Federal Reserve Act, which gives the Fed significantly greater discretion
in its role as lender of last resort when facing “unusual and exigent
circumstances.”220 Subsequent to the failure of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008 and the market fallout that followed, the Fed became even
more creative and aggressive, adopting four additional broad-based facilities
that provided further liquidity support to particular sectors of the market.221
Starting with Bear Stearns, the Fed also used its section 13(3) authority to
provide support for specific institutions it deemed particularly important to
systemic stability.222
2.

Some Explanations

The temporary facilities instituted by the Fed differed from the Discount
Window, and deviated from the norms pursuant to which a lender of last
218 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE
FEDERAL RESERVE’S SECTION 13(3) LENDING FACILITIES TO SUPPORT OVERALL MARKET
LIQUIDITY: FUNCTION, STATUS, AND RISK MANAGEMENT 31, 47 (2010) [hereinafter OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR
GEN.,
SECTION
13(3)
LENDING
FACILITIES],
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/FRS_Lending_Facilities_Report_final-11-23-10_web.pdf.
219 See id. at 32. The rationale was that “[b]y increasing the ability of primary dealers to finance
their portfolios, the TSLF reduced the primary dealers’ need to sell assets into increasingly illiquid
markets and decreased the likelihood of lenders losing confidence in primary dealers.” Id.
220 See supra Part I.B.
221 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SECTION 13(3) LENDING FACILITIES, supra note 218, at
3–4 (describing each of the facilities).
222 See, e.g., William Poole, Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 33 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 434 (2010) (describing the Fed’s use of its section 13(3) powers to provide
emergency assistance to Bear Stearns and AIG).
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resort should lend, in numerous ways. The rationales underlying the creation
and structure of these facilities sheds light on why the Discount Window
alone may not suffice to respond to the liquidity shortages that arise, and
which a lender of last resort should address, in a modern financial system.
One obvious advantage of the Fed’s temporary programs, most clearly
reflected in the creation and structure of the TAF, is that they were free from
the perceived stigma associated with the Discount Window. The effects of
the perceived stigma may have been particularly great in light of changes in
banking over the last few decades. The nature of interbank relationships
today go far beyond the provision of short-term funds and payment systems,
and the potential for banks to be subject to cripplingly harsh market discipline
has gone up accordingly.223 These developments may limit the capacity of the
Discount Window to provide a bank with sufficient liquidity support to
survive once market participants turn against it, in addition to making banks
rationally concerned about sending any signals of potential financial distress.
Another function of the Fed’s temporary programs was to provide
liquidity support to the shadow banking system.224 In the years before the
Crisis, the shadow banking system had grown remarkably, and remarkably
quickly, so that by the time the Crisis hit, this system played a central role in
fulfilling many of the economic functions traditionally performed by banks.
Moreover, while sitting just outside the formally regulated banking system, it
was intricately intertwined with that system and subject to many of the same
vulnerabilities.225 The Discount Window, however, is available only to
banks.226 The structure of the temporary facilities the Fed created, and other
actions taken by the Fed over the course of the Crisis, thus may be viewed as
reflecting an understanding that allowing critical components of the shadow
banking system to fail may be just as devastating to the functioning of the
overall financial system as allowing excessive bank failures; and, the Discount
Window was only indirectly helpful in alleviating those liquidity shortages.
More broadly, through its temporary programs, the Fed significantly
increased the total amount of government-backed liquidity entering the
market.227 The Fed did so because liquidity shortages disrupt markets and

223 Judge, Interbank Discipline, supra note 62, at 1280 (describing how the types of interbank
relationships that exist have increased in recent decades, resulting in higher interbank credit exposure
and more powerful interbank discipline).
224 See ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458,
SHADOW BANKING 25 (2010) (“Upon the full rollout of the liquidity facilities, large-scale asset
purchases and guarantee schemes, the shadow banking system was fully embraced by official credit
and liquidity puts, and became fully backstopped, just like the traditional banking system.”).
225 See supra Part II.A.
226 See POZSAR ET AL., supra note 224, at 2 (“[W]hat distinguishes shadow banks from
traditional banks is their lack of access to public sources of liquidity such as the Federal Reserve’s
discount window . . . .”).
227 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SECTION 13(3) LENDING FACILITIES, supra note 218, at 5
(noting that at the peak, “the combined usage of the lending facilities reached $600 billion”).
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hamper the efficient provision of credit.228 This is one of the primary ways
that banking crises adversely affect the real economy, and the failure of the
Fed to provide banks with sufficient liquidity is viewed as one of the leading
factors contributing to the depth of the Great Depression.229 As a leading
scholar on the Great Depression, Fed Chairman Bernanke was clearly attuned
to this dynamic, and his comments during and subsequent to the Crisis often
focus on the importance of liquidity.230 Hence, the Fed’s many programs may
be viewed as part of a broader effort to transfer more aggregate liquidity into
the financial system.
This list is far from exhaustive; numerous other factors are necessary to
understand the Fed’s actions during this period. For example, most of the
Fed’s temporary facilities lacked a meaningful tool for distinguishing between
solvent and insolvent recipients, despite the longstanding maxim to the
contrary. This may reflect a belief that such distinctions are very difficult to
make in a short time frame, particularly when liquidity shortages are
undermining pricing accuracy.231 Another consideration, more specific to the
Fed’s silence in the face of the alternative discount windows, is that the Fed
may have believed that the market’s need for government-backed liquidity
exceeded the amount that the public wanted to see injected. The movement
of liquidity through the alternative discount windows occurred not only
without involvement by the Fed but also largely outside the public eye. This
may have reduced public accountability, but it may also have facilitated the
transfer of more liquidity than would have occurred otherwise.
None of these explanations necessarily justify the trade-offs inherent in
the Fed’s creation of the temporary facilities. With the benefit of hindsight,
we can see that there was no meaningful inflection point, returning the
financial system to a more positive and stable course, until after Lehman
Brothers failed, government support increased significantly, and reliable
information about the financial health of specific institutions was made
228 See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great
Depression, AM. ECON. REV., June 1983, at 257, 263–267 (arguing that “the disruption of the financial
sector by the banking and debt crises raised the real cost of intermediation between lenders and
certain classes of borrowers”).
229 See BEN S. BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION 42–43, 45 (2004) (noting that
the Fed was unwilling to assume the responsibility to fight bank runs); FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 40, at 357–59; Bernanke supra note 228, at 263–67, 272–74.
230 See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Lecture at
George Washington University School of Business: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis;
Origins and Mission of the Federal Reserve (Mar. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/chairman-bernanke-lecture1-20120320.pdf
(“[P]roviding short-term credit to financial institutions during a period of panic or crisis can help
calm the market, can help stabilize those institutions and can help mitigate or bring to an end a
financial crisis.”).
231 See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Avoiding Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political Economy
of Systemic Risk Management 47 (ECGI Finance, Working Paper No. 277/2010, 2010) (noting that “at a
time of systemic financial distress, ‘liquidity’ and ‘solvency’ are not so clearly divided”). But see
Schwartz, supra note 28, at 59 (challenging this contention).
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public.232 Because it was only after the Fed and other government actors had
effectively backstopped every core component of the banking and shadow
banking systems that the Crisis came to an end, it is hard to know whether the
Fed’s intermediate efforts were on net beneficial. Nonetheless, the Fed’s
actions need not be assumed to be righteous to reflect genuine shortcomings
in the capacity of the Discount Window to respond to the liquidity shortages
that can arise in a modern financial system. These shortcomings may enable
the alternative discount windows to serve a socially useful function.
3.

The Benefits

The potential benefits of the alternative discount windows largely mirror
the benefits of the Fed’s temporary facilities. First, because banks rely on
deposits and FHLBank advances for purposes other than meeting short-term
liquidity shortfalls, banks’ reliance on the alternative discount windows need
not be construed as a signal of distress. Thus, like the TAF, the alternative
discount windows may serve as mechanisms through which banks can access
government-backed liquidity without the stigma associated with the Discount
Window. For the same reason, the alternative discount windows may help
shield banks from excessively harsh market discipline.
The capacity of the alternative discount windows to respond to other
limitations inherent in the Discount Window are more mixed. Because only
banks can access the alternative discount windows, they are little more
effective than the Discount Window in responding to liquidity shortages that
arise primarily in the shadow banking system. To be sure, some of the
additional liquidity transferred through the alternative discount windows may
have helped indirectly to reduce these liquidity shortages. There are myriad
connections between the banking and shadow banking system.233 Just as
liquidity shortages in the shadow banking system can lead to liquidity
shortfalls at banks, providing additional liquidity to banks can help avert
further liquidity strains and promote the transfer of liquidity to the shadow
banking system. Additionally, the Fed took separate actions, such as enabling
depositary institutions to provide massive amounts of liquidity support to
broker-dealer affiliates, which facilitated the movement of liquidity from
banks into other areas of the financial system.234 The alternative discount
windows may thus have helped to alleviate liquidity strains in the shadow
232 See POZSAR ET AL., supra note 224, at 2 (“The run on the shadow banking system, which
began in the summer of 2007 and peaked following the failure of Lehman in September and October
2008, was stabilized only after the creation of a series of official liquidity facilities and credit
guarantees that replaced private sector guarantees entirely.”).
233 See, e.g., id. at 2, 10, 19 (describing the connections between the banking and shadow banking
systems).
234 See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section
23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1729-46 (2011) (describing the ways that the Fed
provided extensive exemptions from section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act as a way of enabling
banks to use their liquidity to provide support for key components of the shadow banking system).
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banking system, but they did so in an imperfect and potentially costly manner.
Framed more broadly, the alternative discount windows likely facilitated
the transfer of more liquidity to banks and the financial system in general than
would have occurred in their absence, particularly during the early stages of
the Crisis.235 There is also evidence suggesting that liquidity shortfalls during
this period had adverse effects on borrowers who had relationships with
affected banks and the communities in which they operated, supporting the
potential value of the increased liquidity transfers.236 To the extent that
limitations inherent in the Discount Window, and limits on the Fed, resulted
in the provision of too little liquidity support, the alternative discount
windows may have helped to bring the amount of support provided closer to
the socially optimal level.237 At the same time, because they are available only
to banks, the alternative discount windows are not well suited to respond
directly to many of the Discount Window’s shortcomings.
B.

Some Drawbacks

The alternative discount windows were not formulated to play this role.
It is thus not surprising that they are not all that well suited to it. This subpart
addresses the main costs that arise from their operation.
1.

Inefficient Risk Assumption

As a bank approaches insolvency, it has an incentive to engage in socially
excessive risk taking, as the bank’s shareholders still enjoy unlimited upside
should the gamble pay off while having little to no downside exposure. The
bad incentives facing a bank so positioned are not a product of a bank’s
access to liquidity and thus are not a moral hazard that arises directly from
access to a lender of last resort. Nonetheless, the ability to convert illiquid
assets into highly liquid ones significantly increases the capacity of an
insolvent bank to engage in welfare-destroying activities by providing the bank
with assets that it may readily redeploy in riskier ways, a practice known as
asset substitution.238
235

See id. at 1726–29.
See, e.g., ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 2, at 20–28 (showing that corporate borrowers with
relationships to foreign banks that had more limited access to dollar liquidity in the wake of the
August 2005 credit crunch paid higher interest rates than similar corporate borrowers who obtained
syndicated loans through U.S. banks that were relatively less affected); Juan Carlos Gozzi & Martin
Goetz, Liquidity Shocks, Local Banks, and Economic Activity: Evidence from the 2007–2009 Crisis
6 (Nov. 12, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1709677 (finding
that metropolitan areas “where banks relied more heavily on wholesale funding experienced larger
decreases in employment and establishments during the crisis” and noting that their “findings are
consistent with the idea that adverse shocks to bank liquidity had a negative effect on economic
activity”).
237 As explained above, the analysis here assumes without exploring that it is appropriate to
treat the Fed’s lending operations as liquidity-creation mechanisms. See supra note 46.
238 That banks must pay a relatively high rate for some of the funds they receive through the
alternative discount windows, most notably those obtained by offering high interest rates on insured
236
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Both the alternative discount windows and the temporary facilities
instituted by the Fed lack a meaningful check on the solvency of the bank
receiving the funds.239 Whether and to what extent government-backed
liquidity actually engendered inefficient risk taking during the early stages of
the Crisis is not clear. While liquidity-constrained banks reduced their
willingness to extend loans in the early stages of the Crisis, bank loans actually
increased over the first year of the Crisis.240 Another significant change in
banks’ risk exposures between August 2007 and September 2008 was that
“large banks . . . appreciably increased their holdings of MBS and ABS
securities and trading assets.”241 There are numerous explanations for these
patterns other than excessive risk taking. For example, many of the loans
resulted from firms drawing down on outstanding lines of credit and the
transfer of loans that had been “warehoused” in anticipation of a
securitization transaction that never materialized back onto the balance sheet
of the originating bank.242 Nonetheless, in light of these patterns, it cannot be
ruled out that some banks used the liquidity access they enjoyed early in the
Crisis to extend loans and acquire assets that entailed socially suboptimal
levels of risk.
More to the point, both theory and evidence suggest that banks in poor
financial health disproportionately use the alternative discount windows to
access additional liquidity. The FHLBanks can make advances conditional
upon borrower characteristics, but in practice most FHLBanks tend to lend
freely to any bank that has an adequate rating from its primary regulator—an
approach that excludes only a small proportion of troubled banks.243
Moreover, FHLBanks have little reason to do more. Because of their
overcollateralization requirements and the statutory preferences given to the
FHLBanks when a bank is dissolved, no FHLBank has ever lost money on an
advance despite the failure of many banks with significant outstanding
deposits, may limit the amount of asset substitution in which they can engage by setting a higher bar
for the expected returns a project must earn. That said, this higher bar may also exacerbate the
challenge, particularly if there is no meaningful external factor limiting the range of high-risk loans
and other investments that a bank may make. Cf. Mark J. Flannery, Financial Crises, Payment System
Problems, and Discount Window Lending, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 804, 819 (1996) (“If the
Fed sets a penalty rate on loans during [certain types of] financial crisis, it may suffer a winner’s curse
vis-à-vis private lenders, potentially increasing its cost of intervention.”).
239 See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 66.
240 See, e.g., id.; Acharya & Mora, supra note 120, at 17.
241 Acharya & Mora, supra note 120, at 17, tbl.A2); see also Zhiguo He et al., Balance Sheet
Adjustments In the 2008 Crisis 11–14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15919,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1560067 (describing changes in commercial bank
balance sheets and the growth of the banking sector during the Crisis).
242 See Acharya & Mora, supra note 120, at 13.
243 See Dusan Stojanovic et al., Do Federal Home Loan Bank Membership and Advances Increase Bank
Risk-Taking?, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 680, 684 (2008) (“[I]n practice FHLBanks define an
‘unacceptable’ supervisory rating as a CAMELS 4 or 5 composite. At year-end 2005, only 44 US
banks (0.59%) posted such a rating, and just 34 of those banks were FHLBank members.” (footnote
omitted)).
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advances.244 The FDIC is more likely than the FHLBank to suffer a loss as a
result of a decision by an FHLBank to provide an advance to a financially
unsound bank.245 Thus, FHLBanks cannot be expected to provide advances
only to creditworthy banks.
The situation is different but no less troubling with respect to insured
deposits. In this context, the funds are coming not from the FDIC but from
the market.246 Again, however, the providers of the liquidity—depositors—
have little incentive to assess a bank’s financial health because, again, the
FDIC is the party most likely to suffer a loss should the bank receiving the
funds fail. And, the FDIC has limited authority to intervene in this
relationship.247 These incentives, in conjunction with the evidence from the
Crisis and the S&L debacle indicating that financially distressed banks tended
to rely on FHLBank advances and insured deposits attracted with the promise
of higher interest rates more than other banks, suggest these patterns will
continue absent intervention.248 There is thus reason to be concerned that the
liquidity provided through the alternative discount windows is
disproportionately likely to be deployed in ways that reduce social welfare.
2.

Systemic Risk

Closely related to concerns about moral hazard are questions of
institutional competence. During the Crisis, for example, individual
FHLBanks significantly increased their overcollateralization requirements to
minimize the credit risk arising from the provision of advances.249 FHLBanks
made these decisions on an individualized basis to protect their individual
financial health.250 Yet, by affecting the ability of member banks to access
liquidity and the terms on which they could do so, the FHLBanks were

244

Id. at 683.
See Rosalind L. Bennett et al., Should the FDIC Worry About the FHLB? The Impact of Federal
Home Loan Bank Advances on the Bank Insurance Fund 6 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper
No.
2005-10,
2005),
available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/CFRWP_2005_10_Bennett_Vaughan_Yea
ger.pdf (stating that the evidence points to an increase, albeit nontrivial, in Deposit Fund losses due
to FHLBank advances).
246 Stojanovic et al., supra note 243, at 683–84.
247 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
248 See supra Part II.A.
249 See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Year Ended December 31, 2008 (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 27,
2009),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1316944/000131694413000005/a201210kfhlbsf.htm;
Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2008 (Form 10-K), at 32 (Mar. 26,
2009),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1325878/000132587809000003/form10-k.htm; OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FHFA’S SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR FHLBS’ ADVANCES, supra note
108, at 7.
250 See Ashley et al., supra note 147, at 33–34.
245
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simultaneously making decisions that had significant systemic consequences.
The FHLBanks have neither the incentives nor competence necessary to
address these effects.251 The situation is no less problematic with respect to
insured deposits. As just described, consumers—the suppliers of insured
deposits—are basing their decisions on the costs and benefits to themselves,
not the costs and benefits to the system; and, the FDIC has limited capacity to
intervene in ways that might address the systemic consequences of changes in
the volume, terms, and allocation of insured deposits. Thus, in contrast to the
Discount Window and other temporary facilities instituted by the Fed, the
alternative discount windows lie outside the control of a regulator that has the
competence to appreciate the systemic ramifications of how liquidity is
provided and the incentives to ensure that it is provided in ways that promote
systemic stability.
A final challenge is that both of the alternative discount windows are
subject to external constraints that the Fed does not face and that may reduce
their utility in precisely the circumstances in which they are most needed.
Banks’ reliance on FHLBank advances declined as the Crisis deepened.252
This occurred, at least in part, because the FHLBanks too faced higher
funding costs, and this reduced the relative attractiveness of the terms they
could offer on advances.253 Similarly, when banks are at the core of a financial
crisis, deposits may become less sticky and the terms banks must offer to
retain and attract them can become less attractive (from the bank’s
perspective), reducing banks’ capacity to use insured deposits as a source of
liquidity.254 As a result, FHLBank advances and insured deposits can become
more costly precisely when banks most need liquidity. This is in stark contrast
to the terms of the Discount Window. Because the Fed exercises full control
over the terms of Discount Window loans and faces no external constraint on
the amount of liquidity it can provide, it can make, and has made, terms more
favorable as conditions worsen.255 This is likely to be the appropriate
response if the aim is to ensure that government-backed liquidity is most
readily available when its absence might doom otherwise healthy institutions
and give rise to other troubling systemic effects.
3.

Liquidity Risk

Another drawback of banks’ ability to access liquidity from sources other
251

See Stojanovic et. al, supra note 243, at 683.
See Ashcraft et. al, supra note 94, at 554 (“[T]he FHLB System found itself ‘guilty by
association’ and saw its borrowing costs (and hence advance rates) rise and availability of term
funding limited. As a result, the Discount Window became the more attractively priced liquidity
facility and saw a significant increase in borrowings.”).
253 See supra Part III.A.2.
254 See id.
255 See Gordon & Muller, supra note 231, at 29 (stating that “the Fed can lend to [banks] without
limit” and “[t]he Fed also has considerable discretion to redefine the parameters of collateral that it
will accept”).
252
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than the Fed is that access to government-backed liquidity may reduce banks’
incentives to maintain socially optimal levels of liquidity reserves. Liquidity is
costly for a bank to maintain.256 Banks thus have an incentive to reduce their
liquidity reserves to the fullest extent practical.257 The less liquidity a bank
retains, the greater its liquidity risk and its fragility. When banks in general
have less liquidity, the system as a whole becomes less stable. This has long
been recognized and is the primary rationale for imposing a “penalty rate”
when a bank seeks liquidity from the lender of last resort.258 While there may
be reasons for reducing that penalty during periods of systemic distress, the
imposition of the penalty under normal conditions plays a critical role in
incenting banks to maintain sufficient liquidity.
For reasons relating to the institutional competence issues just discussed,
neither depositors nor the FHLBanks have the incentives and means to
ensure that banks maintain healthy liquidity reserves. The alternative discount
windows similarly lack a mechanism for ensuring that banks are paying a rate
that is penalized to the appropriate extent, balancing the long-term aim of
encouraging banks to maintain sufficient liquidity and possible short-term
concerns about systemic liquidity shortfalls. Hence, even though banks may
pay a slight premium if they seek to increase their use of the alternative
discount windows as a source of liquidity under normal conditions, there is
little reason to expect that the premium they will pay is at, or anywhere near,
the optimal level. Assuming the premium is too small much of the time,
access to the alternative discount windows may enable banks to maintain
insufficient liquidity reserves, increasing systemic fragility. New liquidity
requirements are being imposed on banks following the Crisis, which should
help reduce this risk, but those requirements are unlikely to eliminate it,
making this an ongoing challenge.259

256 See ORACLE, LIQUIDITY RISK: THINKING BEYOND COMPLIANCE 4 (2012), available at
http://www.oracle.com/us/industries/financial-services/liquid-risk-compliance-wp-1872381.pdf
(stating that “the cost of liquidity will increase as banks look to lengthen their funding maturity
profiles, move away from volatile short-term wholesale funding, and adjust their balance sheets with
higher-quality assets that are traditionally more expensive and historically lower yielding”); Morten
Bech & Todd Keister, On the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Monetary Policy Implementation, BIS Q. REV.,
Dec. 2010, at 49, 52, http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1212g.pdf (noting that liquidity coverage
ratio (LCR) requirement instituted by Basel III forcing banks to hold a sufficient stock of highly
liquid assets may be costly for banks to meet).
257 See Bech & Keister, supra note 256, at 52 (“Insofar as meeting the LCR requirement is costly
for banks, it is conceivable that some banks may not exceed the regulatory threshold by a considerable margin,
which could allow the LCR to impact the implementation of monetary policy.” (emphasis added)).
258 Freixas et al., Review of the Literature, supra note 16, at 158–59.
259 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III:
THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS 2 (2013) (stressing
that the LCR is not sufficient to measure all dimensions of a bank’s liquidity profile, thus requiring
the Basel Committee to develop a set of tools to monitor the liquidity risk exposures of banks);
Statement of the Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm. on the Basel Proposed Rules on Liquidity
Regulation
and
a
Suggestion
for
a
Better
Approach
(Sept.
12,
2011),
http://www.aei.org/files/2011/11/17/-statementno317_134640473279.pdf (stating that liquidity

JUDGE ME EDIT

2014]

3/7/14 9:15 AM

THREE DISCOUNT WINDOWS

4.

145

Information and Leverage

A primary reason for the Fed to serve as the lender of last resort is the
potential synergies between this role and other roles that it fulfills. One type
of synergy is informational. Through its open market operations, for
example, the Fed gains first-hand insight into market conditions on a daily
basis. This is in addition to the information the Fed enjoys as a result of its
oversight authority.
Nonetheless, significant information asymmetries
between banks and the Fed persist.260 These information asymmetries not
only inhibit the Fed’s ability to serve as an effective lender of last resort but
also can impair its ability to make wise decisions with respect to monetary
policy and other matters.261 Serving as the lender of last resort could help
reduce these information asymmetries.
As an initial matter, if banks had little choice but to go to the Fed when
unable to meet their liquidity needs in the market, the Fed would obtain a
constant flow of information about the amount of liquidity flowing through
the market and which banks are facing the greatest challenges accessing it.
The existence of the alternative discount windows weakens the relationship
between the demand for Fed-provided liquidity and the nature and magnitude
of liquidity constraints in the market, thereby reducing the quality of the
information conveyed by that demand.
A related challenge is that banks’ ability to seek liquidity through the
alternative discount windows reduces the amount of leverage that the Fed
enjoys when extending loans through the Discount Window and other
programs.262 There are a number of ways that the Fed could use its role as
lender of last resort to generate valuable information about market
conditions.263 For example, when faced with persistent liquidity shortages of
the type that characterized the Crisis, the Fed could attach
information-generating conditions to certain liquidity facilities or to certain

requirements will not eliminate liquidity risk from the banking system and are not a substitute for a
lender of last resort).
260 The Fed’s failure to appreciate the nature and extent of interconnections among banks is
illustrated in its ongoing effort to adopt a rule limiting interbank exposures. In January 2012, the Fed
proposed a rule prohibiting the largest banks from having credit exposures to one another in excess
of ten percent of their regulatory capital. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation
Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594, 600 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252). In public letters and closed-door meetings, the banks argued that the proposed
standard was unrealistic in light of their operations. See Judge, Interbank Discipline, supra note 62, at
1284–86 and sources cited therein. More than a year later, the rule has yet to be finalized and the
Fed has signaled that it will likely modify its proposal, suggesting that the Fed misjudged the nature
and degree of connections among them. Michael R. Crittenden, Fed Slows Down Bid to Curb Banks’
Exposure
to
One
Another,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Feb.
14,
2013,
5:04
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324616604578304481952496090.html.
261 See supra Part II.A.2.
262 For a more complete discussion of these dynamics, see Kathryn Judge, Thirteen Months (Feb.
5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
263

Id.
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types of loans extended through the Discount Window.264 Alternatively, the
Fed could use its leverage to impose solvency or other conditions that could
send a positive signal to the market regarding a bank’s financial health when
the bank receives support through a particular facility, thereby counteracing
the possible stigma. While there would be risks associated with imposing any
such conditions, just as they were risks associated with the first round of
stress tests, there could also be benefits that would justify those risks.265 The
point here is not to assess when it may be appropriate to use such conditions
but to illustrate why they may be warranted and how the alternative discount
windows weaken the Fed’s capacity to impose conditions as a way of
furthering information-related aims.
5.

Collateral Costs

Most of the issues addressed thus far are greater issues with respect to
FHLBank advances than insured deposits because of the greater magnitude of
those liquidity transfers and the ease with which banks can access advances.
Yet, a particular reason to be concerned about banks’ efforts to attract insured
deposits with the lure of high interest rates is that those deposits must come
from somewhere. The higher the interest rate a bank is offering, the more
willing a depositor will be to transfer some or all of his funds from his current
bank to the troubled bank. Particularly with respect to time deposits like
CDs, the relatively minor effort required to move funds from one bank to
another may be outweighed by the additional interest earned.266 This puts
pressure on the bank losing the funds. A healthy bank may find that much of
its deposit base is less sticky than it had anticipated. And, in an environment
where liquidity is scarce, the healthy bank likely will be compelled to respond,
whether by offering higher rates of interest itself, reducing its lending activity,
or otherwise. Increasing funding costs and reducing the lending activity of
healthy banks are precisely the types of effects that the government seeks to
minimize during crisis periods. Hence, an important reason to seek to
prevent distressed banks from using high interest rates to attract insured

264 The Fed did this in modest ways in connection with many of the facilities it instituted under
section 13(3), but information generation does not appear to have been a primary aim of these
conditions. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SECTION 13(3) LENDING FACILITIES, supra note 218,
at 36–37, 49–50, 61–62, 74–75, 87–88, 101–03 (describing the conditions imposed in connection
with each of the Fed’s temporary facilities).
265 W. Scott Frame et al., Supervisory Stress Tests, Model Risk, and Model Disclosure: Lessons
from
OFHEO
4,
(Apr.
3,
2013)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/13fmc_gerardi.pdf
(discussing
the
inherent risks of stress testing, specifically model risk, or the risk of mismeasurement).
266 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SECTION 13(3) LENDING FACILITIES, supra note 218, at
84 (“[I]nvestors [of CDs] may quickly remove their investments, leaving the fund with insufficient
positive cash flow.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the
Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1197–98 (1988) (“[CD holders] will demand higher
rates of return on these certificates if the stock returns of the bank with whom they are placing their
funds exhibits high volatility—a strong proxy for risk.” (footnote omitted)).
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deposits is to protect healthy banks from having to compete with banks facing
skewed incentives.
There may also be adverse collateral consequences from banks’ reliance
on FHLBank advances as a source of short-term liquidity. Because FHLBank
advances are fully collateralized and the FHLBanks enjoy a statutory
super-lien, a bank’s increased reliance on FHLBank advances will reduce the
assets the bank has to cover the claims of uninsured depositors and other
creditors, including the FDIC, should the bank fail.267 The failure of IndyMac
in July 2008 illustrates why this may be problematic. According to a report by
the Office of Inspector General, a leading cause of IndyMac’s failure was its
lack of core deposits, enabled in significant part by its disproportionately high
level of reliance on FHLBank advances.268 The closure of IndyMac ultimately
cost the FDIC insurance fund approximately $10.7 billion and resulted in
significant losses on its uninsured deposits.269 The FHLBank of San
Francisco, which had advances outstanding to IndyMac Bank of $10.1 billion
at the time it was closed, was repaid in full.270 Given everything else that was
happening in July 2008 and the months that followed, it is hard to trace the
ramifications of the losses imposed on uninsured depositors and the FDIC
insurance fund, but there are reasons to be concerned about both. The
imposition of losses on uninsured depositors can make depositors quicker to
run and so increase bank fragility, a consequence that is particularly
undesirable in the midst of a financial crisis. Losses to the insurance fund
depletes the resources available to aid depositors of other financial
institutions, potentially encouraging regulatory forbearance and increasing the
probability that the fund will either need taxpayer support or be unable to
repay insured depositors at other institutions.271 These risks are particularly
great when, as was the case in July 2008, a bank’s failure is but one of many
and an insurance fund faces probable losses in excess of its resources.272
C. Other Consequences
Most of the effects of the operation of the alternative discount windows
identified thus far can relatively easily be categorized as benefits or drawbacks.

267

Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 558.
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AUDIT REPORT OIG-09032,, SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS: MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW OF INDYMAC BANK, FSB 9–10 (2009).
269 Id. at 1.
270 Press Release, FHLBank of S.F., FDIC Establishes Successor to IndyMac Bank (July 11,
2008), http://www.fhlbsf.com/about/news/releases/7-11-08-indymac-successor.aspx.
271 Sharon Stangenes, Regulator: Don’t Forget S&l Insurance Funding, CHI. TRI. (Nov. 23, 1992),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-11-23/business/9204170334_1_federal-deposit-insurancecorp-loan-deposits-thrift-supervision (stating that the “insurance drain from the savings and loan
debacle almost emptied the coffers of the [FDIC]”).
272 BAIR, supra note 113, at 82 (describing the anticipated losses from the closure of IndyMac
and how those losses contributed to the rapid depletion of the insurance fund, pushing it into
“negative territory” in 2009).
268
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The operation of the alternative discount windows, however, also give rise to
other issues that may be just as important in light of our democratic regime
but that are not as easily categorized as wholly positive or negative. This
subpart considers three such consequences.
1.

Reduced Transparency

When banks access liquidity through the alternative discount windows,
these actions are less salient to the market than borrowing through the
Discount Window, and a bank’s use of these alternative discount windows for
liquidity support may never be fully disclosed. The effects of this reduced
transparency are mixed, and they may depend on the values one seeks to
maximize. Prior to the Crisis, the Fed generally did not make any disclosures
regarding loans it extended through the Discount Window, presumably
reflecting the Fed’s belief that nondisclosure furthered legitimate policy aims,
such as reducing concerns about stigma and encouraging banks to borrow
when it was socially optimal for them to do so.273
At the same time, in response to the Fed’s actions during the Crisis,
Congress changed the law to require the Fed to disclose to whom it provides
funds and on what terms.274 Public disclosure is delayed to reduce the risk
that concern about stigma and other adverse short-term consequences will
deter borrowing, but it is mandatory in all cases.275 The requirement that all
loans must eventually be disclosed despite the potential costs suggests that
Congress, and the public, want more openness about these matters.
Particularly considering that the provision of liquidity can have signficant
distirbutional effects, even if the aim is to promote the overall stability of the
finanical system, the desire for more transparency and the discourse it enables
may be appropriate.276
In this light, banks’ capacity to access
government-backed liquidity in less transparent ways may be viewed as
compromising this legitimate aim.
2.

Reduced Accountability

Closely related to reduced transparency is reduced accountability; for
similar reasons, the ramifications are likely to be mixed. On the one hand,
accountability is core to a functional democratic regime, and creating
mechanisms to hold financial regulators accountable for their actions,
including the provision of liquidity, is one of the major themes in the
273 In response to requests made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, the Fed released
detailed information about its lending activities during the Crisis, including loans extended through
the Discount Window. See Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F.
Supp. 2d 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) aff’d, 601 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010) (ruling that the Fed had to
release specific information pursuant to FOIA requests made by Bloomberg L.P.).
274 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§ 1103(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2118 (2010) (amending and adding ¶ (s) to 12 U.S.C. § 248 (2012)).
275 Id. § 248(s)(2).
276 Judge, Soft Constraints, supra note 54.
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Dodd-Frank Act.277 On the other hand, accountability to the public and
elected officials can impede effective policymaking. That these interests
sometimes compete is well recognized and is one of the reasons for the
extreme independence that the Fed currently enjoys.278
The decisions implicit in the Dodd-Frank Act to allow the Fed to
continue to serve as the lender of last resort and, for the most part, to allow
the Fed to maintain its exceptional degree of independence mean that the Fed
can still provide liquidity to banks and other financial institutions even when
public opinion weighs strongly against such activity.279 But the Fed is not
immune from public pressure. And, Congress has more than once narrowed
the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort authority when it has been used in ways that
proved politically unpopular.280 Thus, concerns about public perceptions or
political backlash may cause the Fed to alter its actions, including by reducing
the liquidity transfers it makes, in ways that may not be socially optimal.
At the same time, at least some segments of the American public clearly
believe that far greater accountability is warranted.281 A lack of public trust in
financial institutions and those that regulate them can have troubling
long-term consequences, and limited accountability may perpetuate such
distrust.282 Ultimately, there is no easy answer to the question of how
accountable a lender of last resort should be. Perhaps the only thing that can
be said with certainty is that the operation of the alternative discount windows
reduces transparency and the capacity for Congress or the public to hold any
single regulator accountable for decisions to provide banks access to
government-backed liquidity.
3.

Reduced Coordination and Control

The final issue worth highlighting is closely related to the other two—
when a bank has multiple avenues for accessing government-backed liquidity,
coordination challenges arise and the Fed enjoys less leverage in its role as
lender of last resort. This can have real costs, such as reducing the Fed’s
access to information and its ability to impose information-generating

277 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§ 1103(b), 124 Stat. 1376, pmbl. (2010) (stating that the Act’s purpose is “[t]o promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability . . . in the financial system”).
278 See Judge, Soft Constraints, supra note 54.
279 See Cooley et al., supra note 60, at 64 (stating that “the Fed is widely viewed as among the
most independent of government agencies” and that “the Dodd-Frank bill does not materially alter
this reality”).
280 See supra Part I.B.
281 See RON PAUL, END THE FED 141–48 (2009) (discussing how the Fed’s “destructive nature
makes it a tool of tyrannical government”).
282 Mark J. Roe, Capital Markets and Financial Politics: Preferences and Institutions, 7 CAPITALISM &
SOC'Y, art. 1, at 3, 5–7 (2012) (“Simply put, if a nation’s polity does not support a strong capital
market, that nation will not have a strong capital market.”).

JUDGE ME EDIT

150

3/7/14 9:15 AM

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.99:xxx

conditions on loans.283 But, it may also have real benefits. The Fed has at
times been excessively hesitant to provide banks access to liquidity, and that
hesitancy can inflict real damage on the economy.284 The alternative discount
windows cannot fully compensate for such stinginess, but they do have the
capacity to mitigate its effects. Framed more broadly, greater centralization
and control tend to facilitate more effective policymaking, but efficacy is not a
good thing when the policies being pursued are wrong.
V
IMPLICATIONS
This Part addresses implications. It first addresses why reform is
warranted and ways to change the programs giving rise to the alternative
discount windows to reduce the tendency for banks, particularly troubled
banks, to use each in lieu of going to the Fed. It then considers the
importance of further study on the role that a lender of last resort should play
in a modern financial system.
A. Alternative Discount Windows
One response to the dynamics revealed here would be to allow the
alternative discount windows to continue to function in their current forms.
Their operation likely increases the net transfer of government-backed
liquidity into banks during times of financial distress, does so in a way that
avoids the stigma of the Discount Window, and potentially gives rise to other
benefits. Moreover, there are some constraints inherent in each of the
alternative discount windows, limiting the degree to which banks can rely on
them to circumvent market discipline or avoid the Discount Window. Only
members of the FHLBank system can access advances, and a bank’s access to
advances is constrained by the bank’s ability to provide eligible collateral.
Similarly, the process of attracting insured deposits takes time and effort in
addition to a willingness to pay higher rates.
While these benefits are real, they are likely outweighted by the costs and
other drawbacks of maintaining the current regime. The historical operation
of the alternative discount windows makes clear that they are used—and are
likely to continue to be used—disproportionately by troubled banks. Their
operation can adversely affect healthy banks and it reduces transparency and
accountability at a time when public will is pushing in the opposite direction.
Moreover, the aim need not be, and as a practical matter cannot be, to shut
down these alternatives entirely. This subpart accordingly considers ways that
the identified drawbacks may be lessened and regulatory accountability
increased by modifying the underlying programs. In light of the different
costs associated with each alternative discount window and the very different
283
284

See supra Part IV.B.4.
See notes 228–77, supra, and accompanying text.
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aims each program is meant to otherwise achieve, the responses look quite
different.
1.

Federal Home Loan Banks

The questions surrounding whether the FHLBank system sufficiently
serves legitimate policy aims to justify the costs of its operations complicate
the issue of how best to address the more narrow set of policy issues raised
here. This section accordingly offers a range of possible interventions,
starting with one narrowly tailored to the issues here at stake and concluding
with an approach that would address the more fundamental questions
surrounding the FHLBanks’ ongoing operations.
a.

Communication

At the very minimum, there should be a closer working relationship
between the FHLBanks and the Fed. Currently, there appears to be little
formal or informal communication between these entities.285 The FHLBanks
have access to confidential information regarding the Fed’s assessments of the
banks it supervises, as it can only lend to banks that have received an adequate
rating from their primary regulator, but there is little indication of information
flowing in the other direction.286 Moreover, each pursues its agenda largely
independent of the other.287 To the extent that banks are relying on
FHLBank advances in lieu of the Discount Window when facing liquidity
constraints, this is problem.
An initial step could be to establish formal lines of communication
whereby the FHLBanks provide the Fed updates regarding banks’ borrowing
patterns, the terms of the advances banks are receiving, and the collateral they
are posting. Because banks rely on FHLBank advances for a variety of
funding purposes other than meeting short-term liquidity needs, this could
result in a deluge of information that is of limited utility to the Fed.
Accordingly, it may be appropriate for the amount of information conveyed
to vary, increasing when there is reason to suspect that a particular bank is
using FHLBank advances to meet liquidity needs or when the system as a
whole is under strain. For example, the FHLBanks could be required to
provide more granular information when (1) member banks of an FHLBank
collectively increase their use of advances by a notable margin within a finite
time frame, such as 5% within a one-week period or 10% within a one-month

285 See Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 580 (outlining how the Fed and FHLBanks
“complemented and competed” with each other during the financial crisis); Investor Relations, supra
note 186 (noting that each FHLBank is a “separate entity, with its own board of directors,
management, and employees”).
286 See Federal Home Loan Bank System: Lending and Collateral Q&A, FHLBANKS OFF. FIN. 1
(Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.fhlb-of.com/ofweb_userWeb/resources/lendingqanda.pdf (stating that
membership to an FHLBank “is limited to regulated depository institutions”).
287 See Ashcraft et al., supra note 94, at 580.
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period; (2) when an individual bank significantly increases its reliance on
FHLBank advances in a relatively short time frame, such as 10% within a
one-week period or 15% in any one-month period; or (3) the Fed requests
additional information. A variety of other trigger structures are also possible.
The aim is to balance excessive information flow and the costs of conveying
that information with the value of ensuring that the Fed learns of relevant
changes in banks’ reliance on FHLBank advances and has access to detailed
information about banks’ use of FHBank advances when appropriate.
b.

Intermediate Steps

A second and somewhat more aggressive reform would give a regulator
that is more accountable to the public, and that has better incentives, some
degree of control over banks’ access to FHLBank advances. With respect to
the issues discussed here, the Fed is one obvious candidate. It may be
appropriate, for example, to authorize the Fed to limit the rate at which banks
can increase their reliance on FHLBank advances under certain circumstances,
like those outlined above. A default rule that a bank cannot increase its use of
FHLBank advances by more than a set amount in a specified period of time
without permission from the Fed could achieve this. Increased reliance could
also trigger other rights or obligations, such as giving the Fed increased rights
of access to information about a bank’s financial condition and access to
senior personnel.
It may also be possible to address many of the costs associated with
banks’ reliance on FHLBank advances to meet liquidity needs by increasing
the authority of a different federal regulator, namely, the FDIC. The FDIC
has less of a role in promoting systemic stability than the Fed, and it would
not be as well positioned as the Fed to consider interactions between banks’
use of FHLBank advances and other mechanisms for banks to access
government-backed liquidity. Yet, because FHLBank advances can increase
FDIC losses when a bank fails, the FDIC is incented to limit the capacity of
troubled banks to access FHLBank advances when they are likely to use the
funds so received to assume excessive risks. Additionally, if an institution is
solvent, the FDIC would like it to remain so, so the FDIC has little incentive
to overly restrict banks’ ability to use FHLBank advances in appropriate
circumstances. The type of authority to give the FDIC would be similar to
that proposed for the Fed. The triggers might need to be modified, and likely
should be based on the total advances outstanding relative to a bank’s assets
or other relevant measure, but the aim would be similar—giving a financial
regulator, experienced in bank oversight and incentivized to limit the ability of
financially distressed banks to access advances, greater authority to determine
if that is occurring and to take preventative steps in response.
Ultimately, the question of whether to give this type of authority to the
Fed, the FDIC, or some combination thereof depends on the extent to which
the aim is to address the capacity of banks to use FHLBank advances in lieu
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of the Discount Window or also to address some of the other inefficiencies in
the current FHLBank systems. The Fed is likely better suited to the first task,
while the FDIC is more likely to also take on the latter responsibility.
c.

Reexamine the FHLBank System

All of the reforms proposed thus far could reduce banks’ use of
FHLBank advances. Because advances are the core business of the
FHLBanks, this may adversely affect their ability to achieve the aims for
which they were created. The extent of interference, however, depends on
the extent to which the FHLBanks and their business of providing advances
continues to achieve the aim of helping homeowners access loans. The data
available raises significant questions about their efficacy in this regard.288
Moreover, while the FHLBanks also play other roles, providing advances
remains their core function. Hence, another way to address the issues raised
here would be to do so in conjunction with a more thorough analysis of
whether and how the FHLBank system should be reformed to ensure it
remains a socially useful program. Particularly considering the fact that the
RefCorp bonds were paid off in full in 2011289 and the recognized need to
reform the other GSEs, this may be an appropriate time to fundamentally
rethink the system’s existence and function.
2.

Insured Deposits

Deposits present a different challenge. There was and always will be a
relationship between deposit insurance and a lender of last resort. By making
depositors less inclined to run, deposit insurance reduces the likelihood that
banks will face a liquidity shortage that necessitates borrowing from a lender
of last resort. But there is a difference between making deposits more sticky
in general and enabling banks to retain and attract liquidity when facing
financial distress. A deposit insurance scheme should seek to achieve the
former while limiting the latter.
Because one of the primary social costs arising from banks’ efforts to
attract deposits by offering exceptionally high interest rates is the risk that
other banks will lose deposits or be forced to offer artificially inflated rates,
this should be the focus of any regulatory response. One response could be
to provide the FDIC with a more meaningful check on banks’ interest-rate
policies and to have the FDIC institute a meaningful system for monitoring
and limiting such behavior. Reforms along these lines were adopted in wake
of the S&L debacle to address the challenge as it was then understood and
could be extended further in light of the ways that troubled banks retained
and attracted insured deposits during the Crisis.290

288
289
290

See supra Part II.A.1.
See Press Release, supra note 173.
See Moysich, supra note 136, at 187–88.
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The current regime failed to prevent failing banks from using aggressive
interest rates to retain and attract funds despite earlier reforms because those
reforms targeted brokered deposits and relied on a bank’s CAMELS rating
and capitalization to signal whether the bank was troubled.291 As reflected in
the findings from Acharya and Mora, however, banks now use the lure of
higher interest rates to retain and attract deposits directly, not just through
brokers.292 More importantly, the Crisis made clear that a bank’s capitalization
and CAMELS rating are poor leading indicators of whether a bank is likely to
fail, and many of the troubled banks that used interest rates to retain and
attract insured deposits could not have been identified using these metrics.293
This suggests that the FDIC likely should have more authority than it
currently enjoys to intervene in a bank’s interest-rate policies. At the same
time, reverting to Regulation Q or giving free reign to the FDIC to limit the
interest rates that a bank may pay on insured deposits would be an
overreaction to the issues identified and could give rise to other costly
distortions.
These interests can be balanced by providing the FDIC with the
authority to intervene but only under specific conditions. In particular, it may
be appropriate to allow the FDIC to intervene, perhaps in the form of a veto,
when a bank seeks to offer an interest rate that is excessively high relative to
that being offered by peer institutions or prevailing market rates. For
example, the FDIC could impose a default rule allowing it to veto a bank’s
proposed interest-rate policy when the interest rates the bank seeks to offer
deviate by more than a set number of basis points and a set number of
standard deviations from the mean interest rate for that type of account.
Because the triggers authorizing intervention would be established by interest
rates currently offered at other institutions, such a regime should not
introduce the types of distortions associated with earlier government efforts
to limit interest rates. Such reforms should both reduce banks’ ability to use
insured deposits attracted or retained with high interest rates as a substitute
for the Discount Window and limit the adverse effects that a troubled bank’s
efforts to attract and retain deposits would have on healthy institutions.
B.

Future Study

In addition to suggesting the need to reform the FHLBank system and
the deposit insurance scheme, this Article draws attention to the many
unanswered questions regarding the role that a lender of last resort can and
should play in a modern financial system. The value of a lender of last resort
291 See 12 U.S.C. § 1831f (2012) and rules promulgated thereunder; The Federal Reserve Discount
Window, supra note 67.
292 See supra Part II.A.2.
293 See BAIR, supra note 113, at 78–79 (stating that the list of “troubled banks” kept by the
FDIC, based on their CAMELS ratings, was misleading and did not reflect the true health of the
industry (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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is well recognized and has only been reaffirmed by recent events. Yet the
Crisis, and the Fed’s responses to it, illustrate that the Discount Window is
poorly suited to respond to many of the liquidity shortages that can plague a
modern financial system. By being creative and aggressive in how it
interpreted its authority, the Fed was able to respond to many of the liquidity
shortages that arose, but there are reasons to question whether the Fed’s
actions, even if defensible under the circumstances, were optimal. Moreover,
the Fed’s authority under section 13(3) has been narrowed subsequent to the
Crisis, making it more difficult, and in some cases impossible, for it to take the
same actions it took during the Crisis should it face similar dynamics in the
future.294 This suggests at least two lines of inquiry that merit further study:
(1) the appropriate scope of authority to grant a modern day lender of last
resort, and (2) the principled norms that should guide how the lender of last
resort exercises that authority.
The analysis here reveals that much of the Fed’s creativity in setting up
temporary liquidity facilities stemmed from changes in banking and the
financial system more generally. The dramatic transformation in the nature of
banking and the rise of the shadow banking system have fundamentally
transformed the financial landscape and therefore changed the nature of the
support the Fed reasonably believed it had to provide in order to help avert
systemic collapse. As other commentators have recognized, however, there is
a significant difference between a standing facility like the Discount Window
and a temporary facility that the Fed can only establish after publicly declaring
the existence of “unusual and exigent” circumstances and satisfying other
requirements.295 Temporary facilities cannot provide the same general
assurance to the market, reducing their capacity to prevent runs, and the very
process of declaring that the conditions of section 13(3) are satisfied may
alarm the same market participants that the Fed seeks to calm. It may,
accordingly, be appropriate to study whether the Fed’s authority to set up
standing facilities should continue to be limited to the authority granted
pursuant to section 10B, the basis for the Discount Window, or whether it
should be expanded in light of changes in the financial system.
Just as important as the changes in the financial system that have
occurred thus far are those that have yet to come. The financial system has
proven remarkably dynamic, changing in response to regulation and to
improved technology and other innovations.296 There is little sign that this
dynamism will slow in the years ahead. Central to the ability of the Fed to
respond to unforeseen changes in the markets over the course of the Crisis
was the breadth of the discretion it possessed under section 13(3) in its earlier
294 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1101, 12 U.S.C. § 343
(2012) (limiting the Fed’s authority to extend loans under section 13(3)).
295 See, e.g., Dudley, supra note 24.
296 See, e.g., Judge, Fragmentation Nodes, supra note 84, 669–84 (discussing the creation and
innovation of mortgage-backed securities).
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incarnation. Hence, the analysis here also raises questions about whether the
revised regime provides the Fed sufficient flexibility to respond to the myriad
liquidity shortages that might arise in today’s, and tomorrow’s, financial
system.297
That the authority granted to the Fed to serve as lender of last resort
may be too narrow when viewed solely in terms of maximizing the probability
that the Fed will have the authority it needs to calm financial markets and
address liquidity shortages does not resolve the accountability issues that
contributed to Congress’s decision to narrow the Fed’s authority under
section 13(3). Transparency and accountability typically serve as cornerstones
in establishing legitimacy, and there are no easy answers with respect to how
to reconcile the tensions that arise when these aims conflict with other policy
goals.298 One tool that has helped to reduce this conflict in the context of the
Fed’s role as lender of last resort is the existence of a robust set of norms
about when and to whom a lender of last resort should lend.299 Soft
constraints, like principled norms, can play this role by providing a set of
guidelines that both shape Fed policy and provide a benchmark that others,
including Congress and the public, can use to hold the Fed accountable. The
challenge is that the most commonly invoked maxims still date back to
Bagehot’s admonitions from 1873, a time when the financial system looked
very different from how it does today.300 And, as the analysis here has shown,
those changes in the system create new questions and challenges for a lender
of last resort. A related challenge, also reflected in the analysis here, is that
scholars and policymakers have learned a lot since Bagehot’s time, and the
lessons subsequently learned are necessarily missing from his teachings.301
Hence, this Article also supports the need for further study regarding the
297 Other scholars and policymakers have also started to ask questions along these lines. See, e.g.,
Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 17, at 417; Dudley, supra note 24.
298 There is a body of literature, primarily by economists, examining the tension between the
demands of a democratic regime and the high degree of independence that economic theory and
empirical studies suggest a central bank should enjoy. However, the focus is generally on the role of
central banks in setting monetary policy, and this literature examines, without fully resolving, that
underlying tension. See generally Rosa M. Lastra & Geoffrey P. Miller, Central Bank Independence in
Ordinary and Extraordinary Times, in CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: THE ECONOMIC
FOUNDATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (Jan
Kleineman ed., 2001) (outlining the benefits and costs of having an independent central bank); Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Spech at the Institute for Monetary
and Economic Studies International Conference: Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and
Accountability
(May
25,
2010),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100525a.htm (arguing for central
bank independence while also discussing the need for transparency and accountability).
299 Judge, Soft Constraints, supra note 54, at 1–2.
300 NEIL IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS: THREE CENTRAL BANKERS AND A WORLD ON FIRE 28
(2013) (“At the 2009 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City conference in Jackson Hole, where
contemporary central bankers gather every August, Bagehot’s name was mentioned forty-eight
times.”).
301 Freixas et al., Since Bagehot, supra note 36 (describing many of the lessons learned since
Bagehot’s time).
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norms that should govern action by a lender of last resort and whether such
norms should vary depending on the nature of the liquidity shortage that the
lender of last resort is seeking to address.
These two inquiries are, of course, intricately related, and they are also
interconnected with the core issue here of whether and to what extent the
alternative discount windows should be closed. For example, so long as the
alternative discount windows remain open, imposing additional disclosure
requirements on the Fed will only partially satisfy demands to know what
banks are relying on government-backed liquidity and to what extent.
Similarly, the availability of alternative mechanisms for accessing
government-backed liquidity may alter the optimal role that the Fed should
play in this regard. The aim here is not to resolve these difficult issues but to
draw attention to their fundamental importance and the failure of much of the
literature to keep up with recent developments.
CONCLUSION
Banks today have access to three distinct sources of government-backed
liquidity. This is not a system that Congress, or anyone, intended to create.
Like many inadvertent regimes, this one has some benefits. But it also gives
rise to significant costs and other consequences, like reduced transparency and
accountability. When values beyond welfare maximization are at stake, there
is no easy formula for determining the optimal response, and this Article does
not purport to provide one. Nonetheless, in drawing attention to the
existence and operation of the alternative discount windows, identifying the
myriad effects of their operation, and proposing some responses, this Article
serves as an important starting point for discussion about whether and how
the programs giving rise to the alternative discount windows should be
modified in light of their mixed effects.

